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New and frightening
warning from the FBI

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on hackers using
malicious software

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to launch a cyber attack
against US businesses.

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In some ways, it's a whole
new way of making warfare,

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and I don't think that
that overstates it one bit.

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There is a cyber war going on.

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The United States
started that cyber war.

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The first cyber weapon

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to threaten to damage targets
in the real world.

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Hackers in places like China,
North Korea, Iran, elsewhere,

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are exhibiting the capability
to hit the power grid.

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Chinese state-backed hackers

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have been mobilized

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anything to do with
covid-19 related research.

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Many of the threats in the
21st century will be in cyber:

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Misinformation, disinformation.

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YouTube, Facebook, Twitter.

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WhatsApp? Instagram?

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We are human species.
We can be hacked.

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Russian government hackers

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have breached the network
of the DNC.

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I don't think anybody knows
it was Russia.

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Russia, China,
and other countries

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are collecting stolen
information from hackers.

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Today we face threats

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that have increased
in sophistication,

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magnitude, intensity,
volume, and velocity.

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What about the confidence
in the vote?

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Especially against the backdrop

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of the Russian interference
in 2016.

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They're involved
going after me on Facebook.

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Because Putin knows me,

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and I know him, and he
doesn't want me to be president.

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President Trump claimed
without evidence,

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quote, "rigged 2020 election
will be the scandal of our times."

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Are you suggesting that you might
not accept the results of the election?

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I have to see.

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Madam Speaker,

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the President of
the United States.

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At the end of the
Bush administration,

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president Bush decided
he had to stop

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the Iranian nuclear program.

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The United Nations has imposed
sanctions on Iran,

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and made it clear that the world
will not allow the regime in Tehran

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to acquire nuclear weapons.

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But he had a problem.

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My second purpose today
is to share with you

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what the United States knows about
Iraq's weapons of mass destruction...

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We had just gone to
a war in Iraq

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on the false pretense
that Iraq had a nuclear weapon.

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So there was no way
he was going to be able to

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publicly convince the world

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to get into a conflict with
Iran over its nuclear program.

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One day, a group of
intelligence officials

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and military officers

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came to the president and said,
"sir, we have another way."

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They told Bush that a joint
Israeli-American cyber team

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had designed some code

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that could get into the Iranian
nuclear control system.

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Until then, countries were
using cyber to steal data.

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To spy on each other.

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But almost no one had used
cyber as an offensive weapon.

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The plan was

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a piece of malware
would be delivered

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into the industrial
control systems

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running the Iranian
nuclear program.

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this network was air gapped.

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In other words, it's not
connected to the Internet.

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So you had to have ways in which the
code could jump onto those computers.

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There's still some mystery
about exactly how this code

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made it from the NSA
and the Israeli cyber unit

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into the natanz plant.

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There are many ways,

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including slipping in a USB key.

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But we also now know

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that the NSA had designed
a brilliant small system,

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about the size of a briefcase,

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that could work from six
or seven miles away,

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beaming computer code
into a computer

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that had been set up
with a receiver chip.

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And that device could be used

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not only to put code in,

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but later to replace it
and update it.

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Once they got in,

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the code started
unlocking itself,

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and it started two major tasks.

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The first one was to record

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everything that the operator
would be saying,

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and essentially,
put that on a loop.

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So that every day, when
the operator came in to work,

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everything would look just fine.

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It's sort of like
a classic heist movie

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where the surveillance video
is run on a loop,

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and the guard never knows
what's actually going on.

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While at the same time, somebody's
breaking in and stealing something.

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The Iranians were thinking
the whole time

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that they're making progress.

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That they're moving
towards their goal,

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when in fact,
these systems are deadlined.

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Because the second task
for the code

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was to take the centrifuges
and break them.

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This code was so ingenious

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that not only did it have
this sort of fake video,

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pay no attention
to what's going on here,

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it would lie in wait.

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And so days would go by,

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where the centrifuges were spinning
exactly as they were supposed to.

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And then all of a sudden,
they'd speed up really fast.

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And then when
you'd turn to look,

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they would slow down
to the regular speed.

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And eventually what
happens when you do this

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to these finely tuned machines,

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is that they break
themselves apart.

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When President Obama
had that traditional meeting

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with his predecessor,
George Bush,

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Bush told him that
there were two programs

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he had to make sure
that he preserved.

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One of them was
the drone program.

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The second program
was "olympic games,"

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the code name for the program
against Iran.

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suddenly, in his
first months in office,

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President Obama finds himself
in the situation room,

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picking out centrifuges
to attack.

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For a while, the Iranians
had no idea what was going on.

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They didn't know if they had
made engineering errors,

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whether they had bad parts.

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They suspected sabotage,
but couldn't prove it.

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Until one day,
when the code got out.

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This code is only supposed
to go into one facility,

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and it was never supposed to be
known to the rest of the world.

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Instead, it escapes the box.

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It gets out of that facility and
begins to spread around the world.

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These are the letters
and numbers

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behind the so-called
stuxnet virus.

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It begins with
a simple USB key.

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Then with surgical precision,

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penetrates some of the world's
most advanced computer security.

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Its creators hid
their tracks so well,

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experts say we will likely
never know who created it.

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As we began to hear about

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this incredibly sophisticated
piece of code

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that the industry
was calling stuxnet,

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I began to reconstruct the story

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of who authorized
this code to be written.

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Neither Israel nor the US

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had publicly admitted that
this was designed by them.

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You did that without at all
mentioning Stuxnet or Olympic Games.

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That was, that was impressive.

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I never heard of those.

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Can you talk about Stuxnet?

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-It's years ago.
That-- One thing that--

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I don't want to
talk about it, okay?

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It's just that, it's a mystery.

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I don't want to talk about it.

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Let me know if I'm not--
If I'm being too subtle, okay?

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This is the first worm designed
to damage the physical world.

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It's a new dimension
in sabotage and warfare.

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The implications and
the possible consequences

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are only now coming to light.

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The stuxnet attack on Iran

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was the first time a major state

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used a powerful cyber weapon

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in a very aggressive way.

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People knew that
the US government

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had been developing tools

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that can manipulate
computer systems

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to create effects
in the real world.

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Stuxnet was the first big
example of that happening.

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Here's what it looks like,
here's how sophisticated it is,

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and here's what it can do.

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You take that same principle,

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you could shut down
an airport with a similar tool.

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You could shut down an
electrical grid with a similar tool.

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You could shut down a gas
pipeline with a similar tool.

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So these things
that were speculative

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suddenly become real.

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The question is,
if you're the first mover there,

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have you now said, "That's
fair game for everybody."

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They've crossed the Rubicon.

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The United States had
basically legitimized

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the use of cyber

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as a weapon against
another country

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against whom you
had not declared war.

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It pushed the world into
an entirely new territory.

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Once the Iranians
took the punch,

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Iran said, "Oh, that's the way
the game is played.

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All right, I get this now."

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And then they started to unleash

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against the United States.

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In 2013, it's clear that Iran
is still working towards

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a nuclear weapon.

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And the Obama administration
in the US

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is trying to start negotiations

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to sort of coax them
away from that.

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In October of 2013,
there's a panel.

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There are several people on it,

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but the really
interesting person

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that comes to talk
on the panel is Sheldon Adelson.

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Sheldon adelson is one of
the richest men in the world.

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He's a casino magnate.

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He's got casinos off China,

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he's got a major casino
in Singapore.

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He's got two major casinos
in Las Vegas,

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and that's really
where he made his money.

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The billionaire businessman

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who made a fortune with casinos

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gave more than $92 million

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to conservative candidates
in the 2012 race.

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One of his most
famous things is

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an effort to spend
a hundred million dollars

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to make sure that Obama doesn't
get elected to a second term.

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You've got to really
dislike me...

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...to spend that kind of money.

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And he's very clear, and,

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and full-throated
about his opinions.

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How are you able to be
so outspoken?

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I flunked diplomacy 101.

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Especially when it
comes to Iran,

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and when it comes to these
negotiations in particular.

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Wait, so you would support

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negotiations with Iran
currently,

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so long as they first seized
all enrichment of uranium?

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No. What do you mean
support nego--

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What are we going to
negotiate about?

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What I would say is... Listen.

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You see that desert out there?

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I want to show you something.

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You pick up your cell phone,

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and you call somewhere
in Nebraska,

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and you say, "Okay, let it go."

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So there's an atomic weapon
goes over ballistic missiles

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in the middle of the desert
that doesn't hurt a soul.

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Maybe a couple of rattlesnakes
and scorpions or whatever.

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And then, and then you say,
"See?

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The next one is in
the middle of Tehran."

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So, we mean business.

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And that was not
taken well in Iran.

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See? The next one is in
the middle of Tehran.

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Somebody gets a
YouTube clip of this.

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It goes up.

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Doesn't take long before
Iran notices it.

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It's clear that Iran
wants to punish adelson.

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And they want to make it hurt.

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Casinos are basically
big banks, right?

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The amount of money that goes
in and out of a casino in a day

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is millions and millions
of dollars.

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And so, casinos spend an enormous
amount of money on physical security.

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On cameras, on security guards,
on vaults.

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Like, the things that
you would do to protect

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chips and cash.

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But as far as their
it infrastructure,

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what does that look like?

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So, around December 2013,

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hackers in Iran start
looking for a weak link

255
00:13:30,186 --> 00:13:32,436
into sands corp's network.

256
00:13:32,520 --> 00:13:35,186
And the hackers just
ultimately get lucky.

257
00:13:36,895 --> 00:13:39,645
A senior software engineer
had come from Las Vegas,

258
00:13:39,728 --> 00:13:42,770
was working at a small casino
in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania,

259
00:13:42,853 --> 00:13:45,061
that's part of
the sands corp empire,

260
00:13:45,144 --> 00:13:47,103
and had used his credentials

261
00:13:47,186 --> 00:13:48,937
to get onto one of the machines
in Bethlehem,

262
00:13:49,019 --> 00:13:50,687
and the hackers found him.

263
00:13:50,770 --> 00:13:54,186
Those credentials allowed them
to get into the Bethlehem network.

264
00:13:55,103 --> 00:13:57,061
And then, from Bethlehem,

265
00:13:57,144 --> 00:14:00,228
to Las Vegas, which is really
where they wanted to be.

266
00:14:04,019 --> 00:14:05,978
They'd start kind of slowly,

267
00:14:06,061 --> 00:14:07,687
but by early February,

268
00:14:07,770 --> 00:14:10,645
they release a few hundred
lines of code,

269
00:14:10,728 --> 00:14:14,728
which is designed to,
not to steal information,

270
00:14:14,812 --> 00:14:16,436
but to destroy computers.

271
00:14:16,520 --> 00:14:20,770
To, to override information.
To really create chaos

272
00:14:20,853 --> 00:14:22,603
within Sands Corp's network.

273
00:14:26,478 --> 00:14:28,520
I received a phone call

274
00:14:28,603 --> 00:14:30,478
from a support desk manager

275
00:14:30,561 --> 00:14:33,436
at about 4:00 A.M.

276
00:14:33,520 --> 00:14:36,144
The support desk manager
had been receiving calls

277
00:14:36,228 --> 00:14:41,687
telling her that people's emails
were getting locked up.

278
00:14:41,770 --> 00:14:44,353
Some of the engineers
tried to look into

279
00:14:44,436 --> 00:14:46,144
what might be the cause of it,

280
00:14:46,228 --> 00:14:48,603
and they couldn't get in.

281
00:14:49,603 --> 00:14:51,770
I wouldn't say that
they were panicked.

282
00:14:51,853 --> 00:14:53,436
I would say that there was, um,

283
00:14:53,520 --> 00:14:57,269
an extreme sense of urgency.

284
00:14:57,353 --> 00:15:00,687
In the morning,
sometimes I check my email.

285
00:15:00,770 --> 00:15:02,812
And I couldn't get to anything.

286
00:15:02,895 --> 00:15:07,353
First thing I thought is, someone's
gonna call me and yell at me,

287
00:15:07,436 --> 00:15:10,228
because probably
the software is down.

288
00:15:10,311 --> 00:15:12,228
Minutes of a software outage

289
00:15:12,311 --> 00:15:15,812
can amount to a loss of
a serious amount of money.

290
00:15:17,895 --> 00:15:19,645
We were getting reports
left and right

291
00:15:19,728 --> 00:15:22,520
of people not being able
to access their computers.

292
00:15:22,603 --> 00:15:26,853
Our internal systems, our email,
our way to communicate.

293
00:15:26,937 --> 00:15:28,478
Accounting, was,
like, paralyzed,

294
00:15:28,561 --> 00:15:30,186
and that place is
all accountants.

295
00:15:30,269 --> 00:15:32,978
I mean, everybody in the back
that isn't IT

296
00:15:33,061 --> 00:15:34,895
is in some kind of finance team.

297
00:15:34,978 --> 00:15:38,061
As the guys kept digging
into it more and more,

298
00:15:38,144 --> 00:15:41,937
a sense of, like,
"Holy shit, this is huge.

299
00:15:42,019 --> 00:15:44,478
Like, the damage is massive."

300
00:15:48,144 --> 00:15:50,853
At some point in time,
we made a decision

301
00:15:50,937 --> 00:15:54,228
that everybody needs to
turn off their computers.

302
00:15:54,311 --> 00:15:58,937
We basically had teams go out
and unplug desktop machines.

303
00:15:59,019 --> 00:16:01,436
We were going to pcs
on the casino floor

304
00:16:01,520 --> 00:16:03,853
in the pits,
and at the player's club,

305
00:16:03,937 --> 00:16:05,228
and in the cage,

306
00:16:05,311 --> 00:16:07,436
and taking them offline
one at a time.

307
00:16:07,520 --> 00:16:09,353
Scanning 'em, cleaning 'em.

308
00:16:11,770 --> 00:16:15,853
We knew at that time
this was a possible hack.

309
00:16:15,937 --> 00:16:18,937
But I still thought
it was a singular event.

310
00:16:19,019 --> 00:16:22,311
That we were basically
doing damage control.

311
00:16:22,395 --> 00:16:24,645
But there were things
that popped up

312
00:16:24,728 --> 00:16:26,978
that indicated that it wasn't
somebody hacking

313
00:16:27,061 --> 00:16:28,728
just for the sake of hacking.

314
00:16:28,812 --> 00:16:30,603
It was a political statement.

315
00:16:32,520 --> 00:16:35,561
The Las Vegas sands website
had been defaced,

316
00:16:35,645 --> 00:16:37,978
to show an image of the globe

317
00:16:38,061 --> 00:16:41,395
with various locations
of the world on fire.

318
00:16:42,436 --> 00:16:44,478
I remember flames,

319
00:16:44,561 --> 00:16:49,019
and something about adelson
and cutting off his tongue.

320
00:16:49,103 --> 00:16:51,561
We were all curious
as to who did it,

321
00:16:51,645 --> 00:16:54,186
and then when we saw what
had happened to the website,

322
00:16:54,269 --> 00:16:55,687
it was like, "oh.

323
00:16:55,770 --> 00:16:59,395
Well, this is a reaction
to what Mr. Adelson had said."

324
00:16:59,478 --> 00:17:02,478
You know, my stomach sank.
It was like,

325
00:17:02,561 --> 00:17:05,603
excuse my language,
like, "Holy shit."

326
00:17:06,687 --> 00:17:08,228
this is real.

327
00:17:11,061 --> 00:17:14,186
A cascading attack.
Servers shut down.

328
00:17:14,269 --> 00:17:17,436
Screens go blank.
A rush to unplug computers.

329
00:17:17,520 --> 00:17:20,561
This attack hit the world's
largest casino operation

330
00:17:20,645 --> 00:17:21,853
ten months ago.

331
00:17:21,937 --> 00:17:23,978
Sands Corp was able to
keep it secret for months,

332
00:17:24,061 --> 00:17:27,478
and to keep the scale, especially,
of the attacks, secret for months.

333
00:17:27,561 --> 00:17:30,561
CNN has learned on
February 10th of this year,

334
00:17:30,645 --> 00:17:33,812
thousands of employees
at sands casinos in Las Vegas

335
00:17:33,895 --> 00:17:36,895
and Bethlehem, Pennsylvania,
had their computers hit.

336
00:17:38,186 --> 00:17:41,186
They didn't want to
get this out.

337
00:17:41,269 --> 00:17:43,895
They wanted controlled
communications,

338
00:17:43,978 --> 00:17:45,770
is what I will say.

339
00:17:48,770 --> 00:17:51,853
That comment that adelson
made on that stage

340
00:17:51,937 --> 00:17:53,687
was a very expensive
comment to make.

341
00:17:55,103 --> 00:17:58,353
the cost of the attack
and recovering from the attack

342
00:17:58,436 --> 00:18:00,395
was about $40 million.

343
00:18:00,478 --> 00:18:02,728
It cost the Iranians
far less than $40 million.

344
00:18:02,812 --> 00:18:05,186
I mean, that's the thing about
the asymmetry of these attacks

345
00:18:05,269 --> 00:18:08,687
is hackers working in a team
for a few days,

346
00:18:08,770 --> 00:18:11,311
You know, they started
probing in December.

347
00:18:11,395 --> 00:18:15,186
You know, a couple of teams got
really active for a few days in January,

348
00:18:15,269 --> 00:18:17,853
and in February,
they unleashed the attack.

349
00:18:17,937 --> 00:18:21,353
You know, that's a very low-cost attack
from a nation-state point of view.

350
00:18:26,520 --> 00:18:29,353
The sands casino attack
was a warning shot.

351
00:18:29,436 --> 00:18:32,269
It was a reinforcement
of the thought

352
00:18:32,353 --> 00:18:34,812
that a middling power like Iran

353
00:18:34,895 --> 00:18:38,770
could shut down a big
economic enterprise

354
00:18:38,853 --> 00:18:40,687
in the United States.

355
00:18:40,770 --> 00:18:44,186
And that if the sands casino
could be brought down,

356
00:18:44,269 --> 00:18:46,144
so could the rest of Vegas.

357
00:18:46,228 --> 00:18:50,144
And what happened in Vegas
wouldn't stay in Vegas.

358
00:18:58,687 --> 00:19:01,895
The evolution of cyber
has happened very quickly,

359
00:19:01,978 --> 00:19:04,311
in terms of its importance
to the United States,

360
00:19:04,395 --> 00:19:08,395
and the organizational dimension
of it in the US government.

361
00:19:09,520 --> 00:19:12,186
In 2007, the director of
national intelligence

362
00:19:12,269 --> 00:19:15,228
issues a threat assessment of
all the threats against the country.

363
00:19:15,311 --> 00:19:18,853
The word "cyber" isn't in it
a single time.

364
00:19:20,853 --> 00:19:22,937
Fast forward just
a couple of years,

365
00:19:23,019 --> 00:19:25,019
you had the creation
of cyber command.

366
00:19:26,186 --> 00:19:29,436
Fast forward a couple
more years, it's 2012.

367
00:19:29,520 --> 00:19:32,645
Suddenly cyber has gone from
not being mentioned at all

368
00:19:32,728 --> 00:19:33,978
in those threat assessments,

369
00:19:34,061 --> 00:19:35,978
to being one of
the top three threats

370
00:19:36,061 --> 00:19:38,061
facing the United States.

371
00:19:42,895 --> 00:19:44,645
Secretary of defense panetta

372
00:19:44,728 --> 00:19:48,228
goes on board the intrepid, which
is an aircraft carrier museum--

373
00:19:48,311 --> 00:19:50,520
I think the background
is not a coincidence--

374
00:19:50,603 --> 00:19:53,144
and talks about
a cyber Pearl harbor.

375
00:19:53,228 --> 00:19:56,937
We know that foreign
cyber actors

376
00:19:57,019 --> 00:20:01,895
Are probing america's
critical infrastructure networks.

377
00:20:01,978 --> 00:20:05,561
They are targeting the
computer control systems

378
00:20:05,645 --> 00:20:10,228
that operate chemical,
electricity, and water plants,

379
00:20:10,311 --> 00:20:13,311
and those that
guide transportation

380
00:20:13,395 --> 00:20:16,228
throughout this country.

381
00:20:16,311 --> 00:20:20,478
The collective result
of these kinds of attacks

382
00:20:20,561 --> 00:20:23,353
could be a cyber Pearl harbor.

383
00:20:23,436 --> 00:20:26,311
And as people were warned about
this notion of the cyber Pearl harbor,

384
00:20:26,395 --> 00:20:28,353
what they seem to miss was,
in fact,

385
00:20:28,436 --> 00:20:31,061
that the US had set up
a regime where,

386
00:20:31,144 --> 00:20:34,061
if they, if Russia took down
the electrical grid

387
00:20:34,144 --> 00:20:36,061
or if China took down
a, a gas pipeline,

388
00:20:36,144 --> 00:20:38,978
they should expect
a military response.

389
00:20:39,061 --> 00:20:42,228
The government had plans
for a massive, kind of,

390
00:20:42,311 --> 00:20:44,061
major attack against
the electrical grid.

391
00:20:44,144 --> 00:20:46,770
What they didn't really
have plans for was

392
00:20:46,853 --> 00:20:49,978
this kind of, like,
incremental, hit a company,

393
00:20:50,061 --> 00:20:51,895
you know, destroy its brand.

394
00:20:51,978 --> 00:20:54,186
Destroy its capacity
to do business.

395
00:20:54,269 --> 00:20:56,395
How are we gonna respond,
as the US government,

396
00:20:56,478 --> 00:20:58,645
to those kinds of attacks?

397
00:21:23,687 --> 00:21:26,937
I started with just
a huge fascination

398
00:21:27,019 --> 00:21:28,812
with North Korea.

399
00:21:33,520 --> 00:21:37,186
Me and my writing partner Evan
would read articles and books

400
00:21:37,269 --> 00:21:39,019
and watch documentaries,
and it was just, like,

401
00:21:39,103 --> 00:21:41,103
endlessly fascinating to us.

402
00:21:41,186 --> 00:21:42,395
Uh, who is it?

403
00:21:42,478 --> 00:21:44,311
It is, uh, Kim Jong-un.

404
00:21:44,395 --> 00:21:45,770
What?

405
00:21:45,853 --> 00:21:48,436
And then when
Kim Jong-un took over

406
00:21:48,520 --> 00:21:51,311
is when the idea really
expanded in our heads,

407
00:21:51,395 --> 00:21:54,478
because we realized
he was around our age,

408
00:21:54,561 --> 00:21:56,645
um, and we read more
about his life,

409
00:21:56,728 --> 00:21:59,812
and he weirdly was like
a very sympathetic character

410
00:21:59,895 --> 00:22:01,561
in, in some ways.

411
00:22:05,186 --> 00:22:09,520
We came up with this story
about a guy who hosts

412
00:22:09,603 --> 00:22:13,269
a very exploitative
late night talk show.

413
00:22:15,144 --> 00:22:19,228
Kim Jong-un is a big fan
of his TV show.

414
00:22:22,561 --> 00:22:24,478
So we get an interview with him.

415
00:22:24,561 --> 00:22:26,311
And then the CIA says,

416
00:22:26,395 --> 00:22:28,228
because we are gonna be
the first Americans,

417
00:22:28,311 --> 00:22:30,186
you know, face-to-face with him
in a long time,

418
00:22:30,269 --> 00:22:31,895
uh, we could kill him.

419
00:22:35,853 --> 00:22:38,186
We pitched the idea to Sony,

420
00:22:38,269 --> 00:22:40,395
and they basically said, like,

421
00:22:40,478 --> 00:22:42,061
"If you get James Franco
in this,

422
00:22:42,144 --> 00:22:44,019
we'll make this movie
right away."

423
00:22:44,103 --> 00:22:45,853
And we were like, "Okay."

424
00:22:51,144 --> 00:22:52,770
If I recall correctly,

425
00:22:52,853 --> 00:22:56,853
it was them who suggested
that we make it actually

426
00:22:56,937 --> 00:22:58,228
Kim Jong-un.

427
00:23:01,103 --> 00:23:03,353
It was something that, like,
we were maybe, we were like,

428
00:23:03,436 --> 00:23:04,645
"Should we make up a guy?

429
00:23:04,728 --> 00:23:07,311
Is that too much?" Um, and,

430
00:23:07,395 --> 00:23:09,645
Sony suggested, like, "Well,
just call him Kim Jong-un.

431
00:23:09,728 --> 00:23:12,019
It's probably funnier that way."
Okay.

432
00:23:16,103 --> 00:23:18,186
So, when the trailer comes out,

433
00:23:18,269 --> 00:23:21,103
North Korea releases
a statement through the UN

434
00:23:21,186 --> 00:23:22,645
condemning the movie.

435
00:23:22,728 --> 00:23:24,978
North Korea is accusing
the United States

436
00:23:25,061 --> 00:23:28,061
of "provocative insanity."
An "act of war."

437
00:23:28,144 --> 00:23:31,353
And promising "a decisive
and merciless countermeasure"

438
00:23:31,436 --> 00:23:34,311
if the US supports
the release of the film.

439
00:23:38,269 --> 00:23:41,395
We were trying to understand
how seriously to take this

440
00:23:41,478 --> 00:23:44,478
and whether there was something
that we should be concerned about.

441
00:23:44,561 --> 00:23:46,687
I called a friend of mine
at the State Department

442
00:23:46,770 --> 00:23:50,478
who directed me to the person
who knew about the subject.

443
00:23:52,478 --> 00:23:55,144
They said the
North Korean government

444
00:23:55,228 --> 00:23:57,895
tends to be prone to
make a lot of threats.

445
00:23:58,019 --> 00:24:01,395
But almost never carried out
on those threats.

446
00:24:01,478 --> 00:24:03,311
And they would certainly never

447
00:24:03,395 --> 00:24:06,603
be able to carry out
on a threat on US soil.

448
00:24:06,687 --> 00:24:09,520
There was no mention
whatsoever of cyber.

449
00:24:11,186 --> 00:24:14,603
Around then, conversations
started to come up,

450
00:24:14,687 --> 00:24:17,853
of like, "should we
tone it down a bit?"

451
00:24:19,186 --> 00:24:21,478
The idea that maybe, uh,

452
00:24:21,561 --> 00:24:26,019
killing Kim Jong-un
so graphically was maybe, um,

453
00:24:26,103 --> 00:24:27,603
extra antagonistic.

454
00:24:36,853 --> 00:24:41,061
Seth Rogen and his group
were very resistant.

455
00:24:41,144 --> 00:24:44,937
They felt that it added
to the satire.

456
00:24:45,019 --> 00:24:49,269
It was a lot of back and forth and there
was a little bit of argument about it.

457
00:24:49,353 --> 00:24:52,728
But we ultimately
came to a compromise, I think.

458
00:24:54,311 --> 00:24:58,061
At that point, we felt that we had
taken all the necessary precautions.

459
00:24:58,144 --> 00:25:00,645
We made the changes
to the picture that,

460
00:25:00,728 --> 00:25:04,061
you know, Sony felt, or that my,
my employer felt was,

461
00:25:04,144 --> 00:25:06,144
was necessary and, you know,

462
00:25:06,228 --> 00:25:08,228
the rest was about
getting the movie out.

463
00:25:12,061 --> 00:25:13,687
In North Korea,

464
00:25:13,770 --> 00:25:15,812
the reconnaissance
general bureau,

465
00:25:15,895 --> 00:25:19,019
which is the North Korean
equivalent of the CIA,

466
00:25:19,103 --> 00:25:21,645
dispatched a young hacker

467
00:25:21,728 --> 00:25:24,853
to go to China
and Southeast Asia

468
00:25:24,937 --> 00:25:29,561
and put together a team that
would break into Sony's systems.

469
00:25:30,853 --> 00:25:32,687
Jim clapper went to North Korea

470
00:25:32,770 --> 00:25:34,603
during the middle
of the Sony hack,

471
00:25:34,687 --> 00:25:37,353
and met the head of the
reconnaissance general bureau.

472
00:25:37,436 --> 00:25:40,019
He was trying to get the
release of two Americans there

473
00:25:40,103 --> 00:25:41,978
while the hack was underway.

474
00:25:42,061 --> 00:25:45,728
And he never raised it because
he never knew it was happening.

475
00:25:45,812 --> 00:25:49,103
The North Koreans
went about this patiently,

476
00:25:49,186 --> 00:25:50,770
and somewhat brilliantly.

477
00:25:52,603 --> 00:25:57,228
In September of 2014, they
broke into the Sony systems.

478
00:26:00,186 --> 00:26:02,978
But they didn't then just
turn around and attack.

479
00:26:03,061 --> 00:26:05,728
They spent weeks examining

480
00:26:05,812 --> 00:26:09,812
how each element
of Sony's operations

481
00:26:09,895 --> 00:26:11,770
were tied into
the computer system.

482
00:26:11,853 --> 00:26:14,269
They lurked in the system
long enough

483
00:26:14,353 --> 00:26:17,645
to figure out how they
could do maximum damage.

484
00:26:17,728 --> 00:26:21,395
And it wasn't until
just around Thanksgiving,

485
00:26:21,478 --> 00:26:24,353
two months later,
that they struck.

486
00:26:27,978 --> 00:26:30,853
I was driving to work.
My phone rang in the car.

487
00:26:30,937 --> 00:26:34,311
The chief financial officer
of the company rang me up

488
00:26:34,395 --> 00:26:36,520
and he said, "we have
a real problem at work.

489
00:26:36,603 --> 00:26:39,269
All the email has gone down."

490
00:26:39,353 --> 00:26:41,812
Nobody was able
to retrieve any data.

491
00:26:41,895 --> 00:26:44,311
And as the day progressed,
it became quickly evident

492
00:26:44,395 --> 00:26:47,436
that it was way beyond that.
That in fact, we had...

493
00:26:47,520 --> 00:26:51,061
Pretty much 70 percent of our computers
had been knocked out of action.

494
00:26:51,144 --> 00:26:52,687
Had been ruined, frankly.

495
00:26:52,770 --> 00:26:55,687
Serious breach at
Sony pictures last week.

496
00:26:55,770 --> 00:26:58,603
A skeleton appeared
on the Sony picture computers

497
00:26:58,687 --> 00:27:01,353
with a small message that claimed
they'd been hacked by a group

498
00:27:01,436 --> 00:27:03,103
calling itself
"guardians of peace."

499
00:27:03,186 --> 00:27:04,937
Whoever they are,
the guardians of peace

500
00:27:05,019 --> 00:27:06,770
have already done real damage.

501
00:27:06,853 --> 00:27:09,687
Employees communicated
with a phone tree,

502
00:27:09,770 --> 00:27:14,103
and paid people with paper checks
cut by a machine pulled from storage.

503
00:27:14,186 --> 00:27:15,687
Sony, by the time this is done,

504
00:27:15,770 --> 00:27:17,687
is gonna lose
tens of millions of dollars

505
00:27:17,770 --> 00:27:19,728
just recovering from
this attack.

506
00:27:19,812 --> 00:27:23,311
It's a huge cost, just in terms of
the impact of the IT infrastructure.

507
00:27:23,395 --> 00:27:26,395
But more importantly,
it's a huge cost to the brand,

508
00:27:26,478 --> 00:27:28,436
because they steal
a lot of data in this attack,

509
00:27:28,520 --> 00:27:30,186
and then they start
releasing it publicly.

510
00:27:30,269 --> 00:27:31,937
Tinseltown's dirty laundry

511
00:27:32,019 --> 00:27:33,895
is laid out in plain view.

512
00:27:33,978 --> 00:27:35,353
And it is not pretty.

513
00:27:35,436 --> 00:27:36,728
The studio's co-chairman

514
00:27:36,812 --> 00:27:38,228
and a powerful
Hollywood producer

515
00:27:38,311 --> 00:27:40,687
used racial jokes to mock
President Obama.

516
00:27:40,770 --> 00:27:42,645
A top producer criticizing

517
00:27:42,728 --> 00:27:45,311
Angelina Jolie's talent and ego.

518
00:27:45,395 --> 00:27:46,978
These are juicy.

519
00:27:47,061 --> 00:27:50,061
We had seen criminal hackers
and hacktivists

520
00:27:50,144 --> 00:27:52,144
use this hack and dump technique

521
00:27:52,228 --> 00:27:55,311
to intimidate victims
on a small scale.

522
00:27:55,395 --> 00:27:57,478
That was the first time
we had seen a nation-state

523
00:27:57,561 --> 00:27:59,019
do it very effectively.

524
00:27:59,103 --> 00:28:00,645
The first thing that
the North Koreans did

525
00:28:00,728 --> 00:28:02,228
was give it to reporters.

526
00:28:02,311 --> 00:28:04,937
And then, when they've
exhausted that channel,

527
00:28:05,019 --> 00:28:06,728
they gave it to WikiLeaks.

528
00:28:09,687 --> 00:28:12,520
This was all very valuable
information to the company.

529
00:28:12,603 --> 00:28:15,812
Trade secrets, like scripts
before movies were released,

530
00:28:15,895 --> 00:28:19,228
detailed contract information
about what had been paid to whom.

531
00:28:19,311 --> 00:28:22,019
By the way, Seth Rogen made
two million dollars more

532
00:28:22,103 --> 00:28:25,353
-than co-star James Franco.
-Mm...

533
00:28:25,436 --> 00:28:27,687
You wouldn't assume
someone's stolen property

534
00:28:27,770 --> 00:28:30,311
was instantly going to be made

535
00:28:30,395 --> 00:28:32,520
available for public consumption

536
00:28:32,603 --> 00:28:34,269
by the media.

537
00:28:34,353 --> 00:28:37,019
Sony were the victims
of a crime.

538
00:28:37,103 --> 00:28:39,395
And then the media
took the victims of a crime

539
00:28:39,478 --> 00:28:41,144
and made it a hundred
million times worse.

540
00:28:41,228 --> 00:28:44,728
You want us to assassinate
the leader of North Korea?

541
00:28:44,812 --> 00:28:46,687
-Yes.
-What?

542
00:28:46,770 --> 00:28:48,478
James Franco, Seth Rogen
here right now.

543
00:28:48,561 --> 00:28:51,728
And that's what the whole world
is doing right now, saying, "What?"

544
00:28:53,186 --> 00:28:55,103
I go to New York

545
00:28:55,186 --> 00:28:58,561
to, like, do the final week
of promotion for the film.

546
00:28:58,645 --> 00:29:00,144
It's a very weird thing to do.

547
00:29:00,228 --> 00:29:03,395
To promote a thing
that is causing the world

548
00:29:03,478 --> 00:29:05,228
distress at that moment.

549
00:29:05,311 --> 00:29:10,228
And that's when, like,
it really ratcheted up a notch.

550
00:29:10,311 --> 00:29:14,978
The hackers made a threat against
anyone who goes to see Sony's new film.

551
00:29:15,061 --> 00:29:18,770
This message warns movie-goers
to stay away from theaters.

552
00:29:18,853 --> 00:29:21,728
The group is threatening to deliver
what it calls its "Christmas gift."

553
00:29:21,812 --> 00:29:24,728
I literally got on a plane and left New
York in the middle of my press tour.

554
00:29:24,812 --> 00:29:26,645
I think I was, like,
on the way to do "Jimmy Fallon,"

555
00:29:26,728 --> 00:29:28,978
and I was like, "Let's
go to the airport. Like...

556
00:29:29,061 --> 00:29:31,269
I don't think this movie's
coming out, guys."

557
00:29:33,520 --> 00:29:36,269
And I went back to la,
and went to Sony,

558
00:29:36,353 --> 00:29:38,895
and was like, "what's the plan? Like,
is it gonna be pulled from theaters?

559
00:29:38,978 --> 00:29:41,978
It seems like people don't
want to play the movie anymore."

560
00:29:45,103 --> 00:29:48,603
When the email came out
that involved physical threats,

561
00:29:48,687 --> 00:29:52,103
there was a lot of conversations
with the theaters that happened

562
00:29:52,186 --> 00:29:55,269
where they were asking to
delay the release of the picture.

563
00:29:55,353 --> 00:30:00,019
I think Michael Lynton didn't
want to leave the theater owners,

564
00:30:00,103 --> 00:30:02,103
you know,
looking like the bad guy.

565
00:30:02,186 --> 00:30:04,395
So, he then was like,
"I'm gonna pull the movie.

566
00:30:04,478 --> 00:30:08,186
"I'm just gonna say...
it's... it's, it's pulled.

567
00:30:08,269 --> 00:30:10,645
"And we all need to come
as like a united front,

568
00:30:10,728 --> 00:30:12,395
and say that
that's what we want."

569
00:30:12,478 --> 00:30:14,561
And we were like,
"Absolutely not."

570
00:30:14,645 --> 00:30:18,311
Today, Sony cancelled
the Christmas day release

571
00:30:18,395 --> 00:30:19,436
of "the interview."

572
00:30:19,520 --> 00:30:20,728
The hackers win.

573
00:30:20,812 --> 00:30:22,061
I don't know
how else to frame it

574
00:30:22,144 --> 00:30:23,478
now that Sony has cancelled

575
00:30:23,561 --> 00:30:24,770
the release of "the interview,"

576
00:30:24,853 --> 00:30:25,978
that spoof about North Korea

577
00:30:26,061 --> 00:30:27,895
starring James Franco
and Seth Rogen.

578
00:30:29,728 --> 00:30:31,603
A couple days later,

579
00:30:31,687 --> 00:30:35,436
we were all gathered
in our bungalow on the Sony lot.

580
00:30:35,520 --> 00:30:37,812
And they were like, "There's
a press conference coming,

581
00:30:37,895 --> 00:30:39,687
and Obama's gonna
talk about it, I think."

582
00:30:39,770 --> 00:30:42,186
And we, we were like,
"He's not gonna talk about it."

583
00:30:42,269 --> 00:30:43,645
Like, and it was like
the first question.

584
00:30:43,728 --> 00:30:45,311
Thank you, Mr. President. Uh,

585
00:30:45,395 --> 00:30:47,186
let's start on North Korea,
'cause that seems to be

586
00:30:47,269 --> 00:30:48,812
the, uh, biggest topic today.

587
00:30:48,895 --> 00:30:53,144
Uh, what does a proportional
response look like,

588
00:30:53,228 --> 00:30:55,353
uh, to the Sony hack?

589
00:30:55,436 --> 00:30:58,853
The question at that time was,
well, how serious a deal is this?

590
00:30:58,937 --> 00:31:03,019
And before you knew it, it was
an international security incident

591
00:31:03,103 --> 00:31:05,603
that involved the president
of the United States.

592
00:31:07,561 --> 00:31:11,478
If North Korea
launched a missile

593
00:31:11,561 --> 00:31:14,019
into San Francisco,

594
00:31:14,103 --> 00:31:18,228
everybody knows what the United States
of America, our response would be.

595
00:31:18,311 --> 00:31:21,186
Right? That's a
physical-on-physical attack.

596
00:31:21,269 --> 00:31:24,311
But what is a
digital-on-digital attack,

597
00:31:24,395 --> 00:31:26,186
and what is the
appropriate response?

598
00:31:26,269 --> 00:31:29,269
John McCain at the time said,
"This is an act of war."

599
00:31:29,353 --> 00:31:32,395
It's a new form of warfare
that we're involved in,

600
00:31:32,478 --> 00:31:35,269
and we need to react,
and react vigorously.

601
00:31:35,353 --> 00:31:37,311
President Obama
didn't want to go there.

602
00:31:38,520 --> 00:31:40,561
When we were in
those conversations

603
00:31:40,645 --> 00:31:42,019
both in the
department of defense

604
00:31:42,103 --> 00:31:43,395
and in the white house,

605
00:31:43,478 --> 00:31:45,645
you fear that if you go too hard

606
00:31:45,728 --> 00:31:46,728
against the North Koreans,

607
00:31:46,812 --> 00:31:48,603
it becomes a real
military conflict.

608
00:31:48,687 --> 00:31:50,561
The last thing you want

609
00:31:50,645 --> 00:31:52,812
is to do something
that escalates it,

610
00:31:52,895 --> 00:31:54,895
and the North Koreans
then hit the US back

611
00:31:54,978 --> 00:31:56,353
in our critical
infrastructure, right?

612
00:31:56,436 --> 00:31:58,895
We didn't know whether
they were in the grid

613
00:31:58,978 --> 00:32:00,228
and could take something down.

614
00:32:00,311 --> 00:32:04,019
We will respond. Uh, we
will respond proportionally,

615
00:32:04,103 --> 00:32:07,186
and we'll respond, uh,
in a place and time,

616
00:32:07,269 --> 00:32:09,353
uh, and manner, that we choose.

617
00:32:09,436 --> 00:32:11,395
It's not something that
I will announce,

618
00:32:11,478 --> 00:32:13,061
uh, here today
at a press conference.

619
00:32:13,144 --> 00:32:15,853
No one really knows what the
US government did to North Korea.

620
00:32:15,937 --> 00:32:18,895
There are press reports
that suggest that

621
00:32:19,019 --> 00:32:20,478
not long after the Sony hack,

622
00:32:20,561 --> 00:32:22,812
suddenly, uh, North Korea's
internet went down.

623
00:32:22,895 --> 00:32:25,186
Even if it were the
United States government

624
00:32:25,269 --> 00:32:27,103
that shut down the Internet
of North Korea,

625
00:32:27,186 --> 00:32:29,937
at the time, North Korea
had 28 websites.

626
00:32:30,019 --> 00:32:32,269
So the United States
is far more vulnerable

627
00:32:32,353 --> 00:32:36,520
to cyber attacks than many of the
countries that are trying to attack us.

628
00:32:38,186 --> 00:32:40,395
The president
didn�t necessarily

629
00:32:40,478 --> 00:32:42,436
have a response to that,
to them,

630
00:32:42,520 --> 00:32:45,937
And so, he chose
to talk about Sony.

631
00:32:46,019 --> 00:32:48,061
We cannot have a society

632
00:32:48,144 --> 00:32:51,103
in which some dictator someplace

633
00:32:51,186 --> 00:32:55,436
can start imposing censorship
here in the United States.

634
00:32:55,520 --> 00:32:57,353
He was like, "Yeah,
theaters should play it."

635
00:32:57,436 --> 00:33:00,353
Um, "We shouldn't succumb
to these threats."

636
00:33:00,436 --> 00:33:02,937
And we were all like, "Great!"

637
00:33:03,019 --> 00:33:05,895
But everyone just bailed.

638
00:33:06,853 --> 00:33:08,311
There was certainly
disappointment

639
00:33:08,395 --> 00:33:09,687
on the part of the filmmakers

640
00:33:09,770 --> 00:33:11,853
that they weren't gonna
see the movie in, you know,

641
00:33:11,937 --> 00:33:13,645
in theaters
all across the country.

642
00:33:13,728 --> 00:33:16,645
We reassured them that we
intended to put the movie out.

643
00:33:16,728 --> 00:33:18,520
I called Eric Schmidt at Google.

644
00:33:18,603 --> 00:33:20,978
He and the folks at Google
felt that it was important

645
00:33:21,061 --> 00:33:25,436
that the picture get out, and they
offered to put it out on their platform.

646
00:33:31,353 --> 00:33:33,103
Ultimately,

647
00:33:33,186 --> 00:33:35,019
they let the theaters
who wanted to play it play it.

648
00:33:35,103 --> 00:33:37,770
It was in, like, 20 theaters
or something like that.

649
00:33:37,853 --> 00:33:40,353
Um, I think it is
still Google Play's

650
00:33:40,436 --> 00:33:42,853
number one ever
downloaded movie.

651
00:33:47,269 --> 00:33:50,603
And also, the scene
is released.

652
00:33:50,687 --> 00:33:52,645
"The Verge"
or something like that

653
00:33:52,728 --> 00:33:54,687
goes through the hacked footage,

654
00:33:54,770 --> 00:33:56,978
finds the shot of
Kim Jong-un's head exploding,

655
00:33:57,061 --> 00:34:01,103
and releases just that online
for everyone to just see.

656
00:34:06,603 --> 00:34:08,978
This was a big deal.

657
00:34:09,061 --> 00:34:11,478
That a country that is so poor,

658
00:34:11,561 --> 00:34:14,645
and has only ten percent of
its population with cell phones,

659
00:34:14,728 --> 00:34:16,937
could actually wage
a cyber attack

660
00:34:17,019 --> 00:34:19,478
against one of our most
powerful movie studios

661
00:34:19,561 --> 00:34:23,436
and a major corporation, and
create an international crisis.

662
00:34:28,019 --> 00:34:31,645
The Sony attack changed
the public�s perception

663
00:34:31,728 --> 00:34:33,687
of what a cyber attack was.

664
00:34:33,770 --> 00:34:35,853
Prior to Sony, people believed,

665
00:34:35,937 --> 00:34:39,353
"oh, somebody's trying to
steal my credit card information."

666
00:34:39,436 --> 00:34:43,853
"They're trying to steal my social
security in order to commit fraud."

667
00:34:43,937 --> 00:34:47,728
Sony was purely an attack
to destroy.

668
00:35:01,269 --> 00:35:04,103
2014 saw, for the first time,

669
00:35:04,186 --> 00:35:07,353
destructive cyber attacks
carried out on US soil

670
00:35:07,436 --> 00:35:09,186
by nation-state entities.

671
00:35:09,269 --> 00:35:11,395
Marked first by
the Iranian attack

672
00:35:11,478 --> 00:35:13,812
against the Las Vegas sands
casino corporation

673
00:35:13,895 --> 00:35:15,353
a year ago this month,

674
00:35:15,436 --> 00:35:19,186
and the North Korean attack
against Sony in November.

675
00:35:19,269 --> 00:35:22,436
While the both of these nations
have lesser technical capabilities

676
00:35:22,520 --> 00:35:24,853
in comparison to Russia
and China,

677
00:35:24,937 --> 00:35:27,436
these destructive attacks
demonstrate that

678
00:35:27,520 --> 00:35:32,436
Iran and North Korea are motivated
and unpredictable cyber actors.

679
00:35:32,520 --> 00:35:34,520
Russia and China
continue to develop

680
00:35:34,603 --> 00:35:37,103
very sophisticated
cyber programs.

681
00:35:37,186 --> 00:35:39,144
And while I can't go
into detail here,

682
00:35:39,228 --> 00:35:41,269
the Russian cyber threat
is more severe

683
00:35:41,353 --> 00:35:43,645
than we had previously assessed.

684
00:35:54,728 --> 00:35:57,895
These days, one must always
get hired by the lawyers,

685
00:35:57,978 --> 00:36:00,603
because the lawyers are the first
call of a company that gets hacked.

686
00:36:00,687 --> 00:36:02,937
Because there might be
lawsuits that would follow

687
00:36:03,019 --> 00:36:04,770
from, uh, from the announcement
over the breach,

688
00:36:04,853 --> 00:36:07,853
so, very, very typically we get
a call from a law firm that says,

689
00:36:07,937 --> 00:36:10,770
"One of our clients, uh,
thinks they may have an issue.

690
00:36:10,853 --> 00:36:11,978
Can you come in and help them?"

691
00:36:12,061 --> 00:36:13,853
In this case, it was the DNC.

692
00:36:16,937 --> 00:36:18,395
The call came on a Friday,

693
00:36:18,478 --> 00:36:20,812
so it took US a few days
for US to go into the network

694
00:36:20,895 --> 00:36:24,311
and find infected machines
on the network.

695
00:36:24,395 --> 00:36:25,978
This wasn't just on one system.

696
00:36:26,061 --> 00:36:29,144
There were hundreds of systems
that were being impacted.

697
00:36:30,353 --> 00:36:32,269
We start looking at the malware

698
00:36:32,353 --> 00:36:35,561
and immediately realized that this was
malware we had seen many times before.

699
00:36:35,645 --> 00:36:39,395
That we had high confidence
attribution to the GRU,

700
00:36:39,478 --> 00:36:41,645
the Russian
military intelligence.

701
00:36:45,937 --> 00:36:48,520
We're seeing them spread
from system to system,

702
00:36:48,603 --> 00:36:51,478
touch files, take those files
out of the network,

703
00:36:51,561 --> 00:36:53,770
stealing data,
monitoring everything.

704
00:36:53,853 --> 00:36:55,395
You can't just shut down
one machine

705
00:36:55,478 --> 00:36:56,937
because they're everywhere.

706
00:36:57,019 --> 00:36:59,186
So you have to shut
everything down, um,

707
00:36:59,269 --> 00:37:02,103
and spend several days
rebuilding all the infrastructure.

708
00:37:02,186 --> 00:37:05,937
We told, um, the DNC, "When do
you want us to do this remediation?"

709
00:37:07,603 --> 00:37:10,687
At the time, the primaries
were in full swing.

710
00:37:10,770 --> 00:37:13,395
Hillary Clinton had not yet
locked down her nomination,

711
00:37:13,478 --> 00:37:16,978
so they said, "Let's plan for
four or five weeks from now,

712
00:37:17,061 --> 00:37:20,228
um, when the primaries are
over and we're not under the gun."

713
00:37:20,311 --> 00:37:22,978
Waiting a few weeks
did not seem outrageous.

714
00:37:23,061 --> 00:37:24,395
Of course over
that period of time,

715
00:37:24,478 --> 00:37:25,978
the Russians continued
stealing documents,

716
00:37:26,061 --> 00:37:28,645
and we're sort of helplessly
watching them.

717
00:37:30,603 --> 00:37:34,395
I was really confused
and disturbed

718
00:37:34,478 --> 00:37:36,812
by what was happening.

719
00:37:36,895 --> 00:37:41,186
But initially, uh, the FBI
didn't take it all that seriously,

720
00:37:41,269 --> 00:37:44,770
and so, it wasn't rising
to the level of,

721
00:37:44,853 --> 00:37:49,061
of urgent, you know,
five-alarm fire, uh, drill.

722
00:37:49,144 --> 00:37:51,269
I want to congratulate
Hillary Clinton

723
00:37:51,353 --> 00:37:55,144
on making history as the
presumptive Democratic nominee

724
00:37:55,228 --> 00:37:58,103
-for president of
the United States.

725
00:37:58,186 --> 00:38:00,603
Finally, in June of 2016,

726
00:38:00,687 --> 00:38:03,019
we kicked the Russians
out of the DNC network.

727
00:38:03,103 --> 00:38:04,520
This just in to CNN.

728
00:38:04,603 --> 00:38:06,937
Russian hackers
managed to infiltrate

729
00:38:07,019 --> 00:38:09,603
the computer network at the
Democratic National Committee.

730
00:38:09,687 --> 00:38:13,103
The researchers were roaming
around the network for about a year,

731
00:38:13,186 --> 00:38:15,269
but were removed this weekend.

732
00:38:15,353 --> 00:38:16,687
We've talked to DNC officials.

733
00:38:16,770 --> 00:38:19,520
We've also talked to the outside
firm that the DNC brought in

734
00:38:19,603 --> 00:38:21,520
when they recognized
that there was an issue here.

735
00:38:21,603 --> 00:38:22,978
That firm called CrowdStrike.

736
00:38:23,061 --> 00:38:26,186
There was a small blip on
the, on the, on the news cycle

737
00:38:26,269 --> 00:38:29,144
that day, of, "Oh,
Russia's hacking the DNC,"

738
00:38:29,228 --> 00:38:31,645
but national media
moved on within hours,

739
00:38:31,728 --> 00:38:34,520
and, uh, I thought that was
gonna be the end of the story.

740
00:38:37,186 --> 00:38:41,395
But then on the Eve of the
Democratic national convention...

741
00:38:43,520 --> 00:38:46,395
Wikileaks dumps the emails.

742
00:38:49,061 --> 00:38:51,978
Good evening. Their party's
chairman off the program,

743
00:38:52,061 --> 00:38:53,978
an apparent Russian email hack,

744
00:38:54,061 --> 00:38:56,478
and now a revolt among
Bernie Sanders supporters.

745
00:38:56,561 --> 00:39:00,019
Welcome to day one of the
Democratic National Convention.

746
00:39:02,228 --> 00:39:05,353
The information stolen
from those servers in the DNC,

747
00:39:05,436 --> 00:39:07,728
suddenly it begins to
surface in this way

748
00:39:07,812 --> 00:39:09,770
that was presaged by
the Sony attack,

749
00:39:09,853 --> 00:39:11,019
and the Sands Corp attack.

750
00:39:11,103 --> 00:39:12,812
emails released by wikileaks,

751
00:39:12,895 --> 00:39:16,228
proving the DNC had favored
Hillary Clinton over Sanders.

752
00:39:16,311 --> 00:39:19,186
Comes out through WikiLeaks, which
makes everything searchable so you'd be,

753
00:39:19,269 --> 00:39:21,520
you know, there'll be a dump
of 20,000 emails

754
00:39:21,603 --> 00:39:23,603
and you just type in some names
if you're a reporter,

755
00:39:23,687 --> 00:39:25,061
and suddenly you've got a story.

756
00:39:25,144 --> 00:39:26,853
The thousands of hacked emails

757
00:39:26,937 --> 00:39:28,103
leaked to wikileaks

758
00:39:28,186 --> 00:39:30,353
rocked the Democratic
national committee.

759
00:39:31,853 --> 00:39:33,061
I'm so proud--

760
00:39:35,478 --> 00:39:37,561
One of the things
they were doing

761
00:39:37,645 --> 00:39:43,728
was trying to stir up trouble
between the Bernie delegates

762
00:39:43,812 --> 00:39:45,728
and, and, and our forces.

763
00:39:45,812 --> 00:39:48,269
Bernie Sanders supporters
say the emails proved

764
00:39:48,353 --> 00:39:50,812
the party favored
Hillary Clinton all along.

765
00:39:50,895 --> 00:39:52,812
It just validated
everything we thought.

766
00:39:52,895 --> 00:39:55,520
That this was completely rigged
right from the beginning.

767
00:39:55,603 --> 00:39:58,269
By using that stolen material,

768
00:39:58,353 --> 00:40:01,937
the media injected the idea that
the DNC had rigged the entire process

769
00:40:02,019 --> 00:40:04,311
against Bernie Sanders.
And there's a kernel of truth.

770
00:40:04,395 --> 00:40:07,812
Clearly there are people in the
DNC who didn't like Bernie Sanders.

771
00:40:07,895 --> 00:40:09,603
But that doesn't mean
the whole process is rigged.

772
00:40:09,687 --> 00:40:12,770
And the media allowed them to go
from the kernel of truth

773
00:40:12,853 --> 00:40:14,728
to the conventional wisdom,

774
00:40:14,812 --> 00:40:16,353
Because it sold papers,

775
00:40:16,436 --> 00:40:19,561
and it got people to watch TV.

776
00:40:19,645 --> 00:40:23,478
But they were amplifying the messages
that the Russians wanted amplified.

777
00:40:26,311 --> 00:40:28,728
In that pile of information

778
00:40:28,812 --> 00:40:30,395
that's come from the DNC,

779
00:40:30,478 --> 00:40:33,978
there were some documents that
were campaign finance documents

780
00:40:34,061 --> 00:40:35,895
from the campaign that would--

781
00:40:35,978 --> 00:40:39,061
had been unlikely
to be at the DNC.

782
00:40:39,853 --> 00:40:42,937
So, the campaign
began to look at

783
00:40:43,019 --> 00:40:45,019
where might those
have originated.

784
00:40:47,520 --> 00:40:48,978
turned out, in the spring,

785
00:40:49,061 --> 00:40:51,937
one of my colleagues who
had access to my email account

786
00:40:52,019 --> 00:40:55,228
had seen what was
a fairly professional

787
00:40:55,311 --> 00:40:59,561
phishing operation,
looking to be from Google.

788
00:41:00,520 --> 00:41:02,853
She reported that to the people

789
00:41:02,937 --> 00:41:06,728
in the tech security side
of the campaign.

790
00:41:06,812 --> 00:41:13,269
He sent back an email to my
assistant saying that it was real,

791
00:41:13,353 --> 00:41:16,019
and that I should change
my credentials.

792
00:41:16,770 --> 00:41:18,812
She then clicked on the link,

793
00:41:18,895 --> 00:41:22,561
and that's how I was hacked
by the Russians.

794
00:41:22,645 --> 00:41:26,395
But at that point, we weren't sure
what the extent of the breach had been.

795
00:41:30,019 --> 00:41:32,978
In the summer and fall of 2016,

796
00:41:33,061 --> 00:41:35,978
there were many meetings
about the Russians.

797
00:41:36,061 --> 00:41:39,895
There was a lot of
back and forth about what to do.

798
00:41:40,978 --> 00:41:43,269
We began to get information

799
00:41:43,353 --> 00:41:47,895
about cyber activity that was focused
on our voter registration databases.

800
00:41:49,353 --> 00:41:52,812
And we realized that it was
probably about disrupting

801
00:41:52,895 --> 00:41:55,311
the integrity of that data.

802
00:41:55,395 --> 00:41:58,311
The Russians could go into
a voter registration database

803
00:41:58,395 --> 00:41:59,937
and change that data,

804
00:42:00,019 --> 00:42:03,353
so that on election day,
when voters show up to vote,

805
00:42:03,436 --> 00:42:05,186
they are turned away.

806
00:42:05,269 --> 00:42:07,019
There is chaos
at the voting place,

807
00:42:07,103 --> 00:42:10,228
because the name doesn't
match the identification,

808
00:42:10,311 --> 00:42:13,978
and you could
disrupt election day

809
00:42:14,061 --> 00:42:16,061
to the degree that
the American public

810
00:42:16,144 --> 00:42:18,520
would doubt the legitimacy
of the process,

811
00:42:18,603 --> 00:42:22,395
and then potentially,
the legitimacy of the outcome.

812
00:42:24,144 --> 00:42:27,561
That's what Obama's focus was.

813
00:42:27,645 --> 00:42:30,770
When Obama saw putin
in September,

814
00:42:31,436 --> 00:42:34,228
he basically threatened him

815
00:42:34,311 --> 00:42:36,853
that if they tried
something like that,

816
00:42:36,937 --> 00:42:39,478
there'd be severe consequences.

817
00:42:39,561 --> 00:42:42,436
What I think they
underappreciated

818
00:42:42,520 --> 00:42:46,603
was how much effect the Russians
could have from the hacking,

819
00:42:46,687 --> 00:42:50,436
and from their massive
disinformation operation.

820
00:42:54,228 --> 00:42:56,103
During the election,

821
00:42:56,186 --> 00:42:58,144
we had a dedicated team
at Facebook

822
00:42:58,228 --> 00:43:00,853
whose job it was to
look for Russian actors.

823
00:43:00,937 --> 00:43:05,436
And we had found GRU activity.
We had found DCLeaks.

824
00:43:05,520 --> 00:43:07,269
We had found them pushing
disinformation,

825
00:43:07,353 --> 00:43:08,645
but not really at scale.

826
00:43:08,728 --> 00:43:10,478
And we didn't really understand

827
00:43:10,561 --> 00:43:13,520
what was behind the vast
majority of this fake news.

828
00:43:14,978 --> 00:43:17,019
But right after the election,

829
00:43:17,103 --> 00:43:19,228
we took all of the
political ads that were run

830
00:43:19,311 --> 00:43:21,436
in the United States
in the year before the election.

831
00:43:21,520 --> 00:43:24,103
And then we figured out all the
accounts that were possibly tied to it.

832
00:43:24,186 --> 00:43:27,186
So this is the people who
ran the ad, but then also,

833
00:43:27,269 --> 00:43:29,895
people who used the same
computer as the person who ran an ad.

834
00:43:29,978 --> 00:43:33,269
Or people who have used the same
phone as the person who ran the ad.

835
00:43:33,353 --> 00:43:35,311
And then for every single one
of those accounts,

836
00:43:35,395 --> 00:43:37,728
we looked for possible links
to Russia.

837
00:43:37,812 --> 00:43:40,728
We start pulling that thread, and
then we eventually find this cluster

838
00:43:40,812 --> 00:43:43,853
that we can all link together, and
that was the Internet Research Agency.

839
00:43:51,395 --> 00:43:53,228
The Internet research
agency, llc

840
00:43:53,311 --> 00:43:55,770
is basically a building
in St. Petersburg

841
00:43:55,853 --> 00:43:57,853
with a bunch of trolls
sitting there

842
00:43:57,937 --> 00:44:01,353
trying to drive divisions
in US society.

843
00:44:01,436 --> 00:44:03,978
It's existed for years
and years at this point.

844
00:44:04,061 --> 00:44:06,478
And they've done
propaganda work in Russia,

845
00:44:06,561 --> 00:44:08,978
and Ukraine, and the like.

846
00:44:09,061 --> 00:44:12,812
The ira specifically sent people
to the United States to study

847
00:44:12,895 --> 00:44:15,144
the political sphere in the US

848
00:44:15,228 --> 00:44:17,353
and to understand what
the pressure points were.

849
00:44:17,770 --> 00:44:19,353
So in 2016,

850
00:44:19,436 --> 00:44:21,728
they were creating
these fake American personas,

851
00:44:21,812 --> 00:44:25,144
and then running ads
as political groups.

852
00:44:34,728 --> 00:44:36,561
The depth of the content
was surprising.

853
00:44:36,645 --> 00:44:39,978
Our assumption was that all of this
content would be on one side, politically.

854
00:44:40,061 --> 00:44:42,269
But what they had done
very effectively

855
00:44:42,353 --> 00:44:44,520
was find a friction point

856
00:44:44,603 --> 00:44:47,061
and then try to manipulate
people on both sides.

857
00:44:48,478 --> 00:44:50,978
The number-one topic was
actually black lives matter.

858
00:44:51,061 --> 00:44:54,061
They created a fake persona
to pretend to be

859
00:44:54,144 --> 00:44:56,645
a pro-black lives matter
activist.

860
00:44:57,311 --> 00:44:58,978
And to push narratives

861
00:44:59,061 --> 00:45:01,144
that both would maybe radicalize

862
00:45:01,228 --> 00:45:02,812
people who were supportive
of black lives matter,

863
00:45:02,895 --> 00:45:04,645
but also look radical

864
00:45:04,728 --> 00:45:06,103
to more moderate people

865
00:45:06,186 --> 00:45:08,061
who could say, like,
"oh, look at these people.

866
00:45:08,144 --> 00:45:11,436
Yeah, they're, they're
they're really nuts."

867
00:45:11,520 --> 00:45:14,687
They even, in a couple of cases,
tried to create protests

868
00:45:14,770 --> 00:45:17,186
where a pro-immigration group
and an anti-immigration group

869
00:45:17,269 --> 00:45:21,687
protest one another by inviting people
to events that were at the same time.

870
00:45:21,770 --> 00:45:24,895
Down with the racists!
Down with the Nazis!

871
00:45:31,770 --> 00:45:33,895
We were surprised that

872
00:45:33,978 --> 00:45:36,061
putin would care so much

873
00:45:36,144 --> 00:45:39,269
about who the
next president was.

874
00:45:39,353 --> 00:45:43,770
That he was so intent
upon damaging me,

875
00:45:43,853 --> 00:45:45,436
Damaging my campaign,

876
00:45:45,520 --> 00:45:49,103
preventing me, if he could,
from becoming president.

877
00:45:49,186 --> 00:45:51,978
And also how adept they were

878
00:45:52,061 --> 00:45:55,561
in sowing disinformation,
misinformation.

879
00:45:55,645 --> 00:45:58,478
It was unlike anything
we'd ever seen.

880
00:46:01,311 --> 00:46:03,436
None of us kind of
conceptualized this

881
00:46:03,520 --> 00:46:06,269
as the kind of groups
we should be looking for.

882
00:46:07,144 --> 00:46:09,186
Intelligence teams
at the companies,

883
00:46:09,269 --> 00:46:11,728
and in places like NSA
and the US government,

884
00:46:11,812 --> 00:46:15,061
were focused on very
traditional threat actors.

885
00:46:18,353 --> 00:46:21,478
General clapper's this old
cold warrior.

886
00:46:21,561 --> 00:46:25,228
Grew up as the son of
an air force officer,

887
00:46:25,311 --> 00:46:27,728
becomes an air force
intelligence officer.

888
00:46:27,812 --> 00:46:31,770
And yet, the cyber conflicts

889
00:46:31,853 --> 00:46:34,269
that are springing up
during his time

890
00:46:34,353 --> 00:46:36,436
as director of
National Intelligence

891
00:46:36,520 --> 00:46:38,853
Are an entirely different
kind of threat

892
00:46:38,937 --> 00:46:41,770
that he's just trying
to keep on top of.

893
00:46:41,853 --> 00:46:44,144
And time and time again,

894
00:46:44,228 --> 00:46:47,770
he keeps getting caught
by surprise.

895
00:46:47,853 --> 00:46:49,561
It's not his fault.

896
00:46:49,645 --> 00:46:53,103
We had never built
an intelligence network

897
00:46:53,186 --> 00:46:55,603
designed to pick this stuff up.

898
00:46:55,687 --> 00:46:58,561
But there he is in North Korea

899
00:46:58,645 --> 00:47:00,978
while the North Koreans
are inside Sony.

900
00:47:01,061 --> 00:47:04,019
And there he was,
sitting on a system

901
00:47:04,103 --> 00:47:06,728
that failed to raise
a timely alarm

902
00:47:06,812 --> 00:47:08,645
to the president
of the United States

903
00:47:08,728 --> 00:47:12,144
that the Russians were inside
the Democratic national committee.

904
00:47:12,228 --> 00:47:14,186
Much less inside Facebook.

905
00:47:19,728 --> 00:47:23,937
You know, 20/20 hindsight,
it's all, it's perfect vision.

906
00:47:24,019 --> 00:47:28,311
At the time, there was concern
about publicizing this,

907
00:47:28,395 --> 00:47:32,770
because by doing so, we'd
simply amplify its importance.

908
00:47:32,853 --> 00:47:35,812
And I think, as well,
there was reluctance

909
00:47:35,895 --> 00:47:38,520
to be seen by the
last administration as

910
00:47:38,603 --> 00:47:40,436
putting its hand on the scale

911
00:47:40,520 --> 00:47:43,520
in favor of one candidate,
or appearing to do that,

912
00:47:43,603 --> 00:47:45,645
To the disfavor of the other.

913
00:47:45,728 --> 00:47:47,687
The system, folks, is rigged.

914
00:47:47,770 --> 00:47:51,353
It's a rigged, disgusting,
dirty system.

915
00:47:51,436 --> 00:47:53,395
It's a dirty system.

916
00:47:54,269 --> 00:47:56,520
Then candidate Trump
was alleging

917
00:47:56,603 --> 00:47:59,311
that if he didn't win
the election, it was rigged.

918
00:47:59,395 --> 00:48:01,186
So, there was reluctance to,

919
00:48:01,269 --> 00:48:04,144
you know, to play to that--
to play to that narrative.

920
00:48:08,144 --> 00:48:10,728
But the magnitude of what
the Russians were doing

921
00:48:10,812 --> 00:48:14,061
grew both in expanse
and clarity.

922
00:48:14,144 --> 00:48:16,353
And on the 7th of October,

923
00:48:16,436 --> 00:48:18,770
we finally came out
with a public statement,

924
00:48:18,853 --> 00:48:20,645
which was a pretty
forthcoming statement

925
00:48:20,728 --> 00:48:22,353
about the Russian interference.

926
00:48:22,436 --> 00:48:24,395
there's more breaking news
we're following tonight.

927
00:48:24,478 --> 00:48:26,728
The United States
now openly saying

928
00:48:26,812 --> 00:48:30,395
that Russia is directly behind
a series of cyber attacks

929
00:48:30,478 --> 00:48:33,061
targeting the upcoming
presidential election.

930
00:48:33,144 --> 00:48:36,061
Well, unfortunately our message
was completely emasculated.

931
00:48:36,144 --> 00:48:39,395
A recording of Donald Trump
made more than a decade ago...

932
00:48:39,478 --> 00:48:43,269
Because that's the same day that the
"Access Hollywood" audio tape came out.

933
00:48:43,353 --> 00:48:45,311
You won't want young children
to hear it.

934
00:48:53,395 --> 00:48:56,395
The letter from the intelligence
community comes out.

935
00:48:56,478 --> 00:48:58,728
The "Access Hollywood"
tape comes out

936
00:48:58,812 --> 00:49:00,436
all in one day.

937
00:49:00,520 --> 00:49:03,269
And WikiLeaks starts
dumping my emails

938
00:49:03,353 --> 00:49:06,144
an hour after the "Access
Hollywood" tape comes out.

939
00:49:06,228 --> 00:49:08,478
You can judge whether
that's a coincidence.

940
00:49:08,561 --> 00:49:10,520
Two thousand more emails
have been posted online,

941
00:49:10,603 --> 00:49:12,103
apparently from
the hacked account

942
00:49:12,186 --> 00:49:14,395
Of Hillary Clinton's
campaign chairman John podesta.

943
00:49:14,478 --> 00:49:18,269
Thousands of hacked emails from
her campaign chairman, John Podesta.

944
00:49:18,353 --> 00:49:19,937
Third installment
of the hacked emails

945
00:49:20,019 --> 00:49:22,603
from Hillary Clinton's
campaign chairman John Podesta,

946
00:49:22,687 --> 00:49:24,520
and so far, the messages
have provided a look

947
00:49:24,603 --> 00:49:26,978
into the inner workings
of the Clinton camp.

948
00:49:27,061 --> 00:49:31,812
Most of those ended up
being of little import.

949
00:49:34,645 --> 00:49:36,395
I'm a boring sort of guy.

950
00:49:36,478 --> 00:49:38,561
One email reveals
a disagreement

951
00:49:38,645 --> 00:49:40,687
between top Clinton aide
huma abedin

952
00:49:40,770 --> 00:49:43,103
and podesta over Clinton's
press strategy.

953
00:49:43,186 --> 00:49:44,770
A lot of this was gossip.

954
00:49:44,853 --> 00:49:46,937
In another email,
a longtime Clinton aide

955
00:49:47,019 --> 00:49:50,144
refers to Chelsea Clinton
as a, quote, "spoiled brat."

956
00:49:50,228 --> 00:49:53,687
But people thought, well,
if it's secret,

957
00:49:53,770 --> 00:49:55,687
or if it's stolen,

958
00:49:55,770 --> 00:49:57,978
it must be more sexy.

959
00:49:58,061 --> 00:49:59,770
It's kind of shadowy.

960
00:49:59,853 --> 00:50:01,978
"They didn't want you
to know this much."

961
00:50:02,061 --> 00:50:03,770
Like any good peek
behind the curtains,

962
00:50:03,853 --> 00:50:06,812
they show things the campaign
obviously would rather keep under wraps.

963
00:50:06,895 --> 00:50:08,978
The Clinton emails
are fascinating

964
00:50:09,061 --> 00:50:10,728
and hilarious reading
in some ways.

965
00:50:10,812 --> 00:50:12,853
So is it more like "Veep"
or is it more like "West Wing"?

966
00:50:12,937 --> 00:50:16,144
We were very frustrated.

967
00:50:16,228 --> 00:50:19,311
The fact that this was
a hostile foreign government

968
00:50:19,395 --> 00:50:21,103
interfering in the election

969
00:50:21,186 --> 00:50:25,353
was never really part of
what the coverage was.

970
00:50:25,436 --> 00:50:28,103
I would just add, you know, this
should be of concern to everyone

971
00:50:28,186 --> 00:50:31,812
that the Russians are trying to
influence our election.

972
00:50:31,895 --> 00:50:34,561
You know, everybody
was clearly informed

973
00:50:34,645 --> 00:50:37,019
about my email mistakes,
but they didn't know

974
00:50:37,103 --> 00:50:40,436
there was an active campaign
against us by the Russians.

975
00:50:40,520 --> 00:50:43,812
they did not know that
the trump campaign had personnel

976
00:50:43,895 --> 00:50:47,103
associated with it, who
were also being investigated.

977
00:50:47,186 --> 00:50:50,353
If you look at trump's campaign
the last month,

978
00:50:50,436 --> 00:50:53,687
he mentioned WikiLeaks
over 160 times.

979
00:50:53,770 --> 00:50:56,687
And they used the most perverse

980
00:50:56,770 --> 00:50:59,853
Twisting of anything
in John podesta's emails

981
00:50:59,937 --> 00:51:02,645
to create controversy,

982
00:51:02,728 --> 00:51:05,186
and, uh, sow distrust.

983
00:51:05,269 --> 00:51:08,687
A Russian news outlet just totally
misrepresented one of these emails,

984
00:51:08,770 --> 00:51:10,061
and then Donald Trump read it.

985
00:51:10,144 --> 00:51:11,687
She's now admitting that
they could have

986
00:51:11,770 --> 00:51:13,228
done something about Benghazi.

987
00:51:13,311 --> 00:51:15,228
This just came out
a little while ago.

988
00:51:15,311 --> 00:51:17,269
There was, like,
an email story every day,

989
00:51:17,353 --> 00:51:20,895
and then Comey drops
this hand grenade on us.

990
00:51:20,978 --> 00:51:22,895
The October surprise
came in the form

991
00:51:22,978 --> 00:51:25,186
of a three-paragraph
letter to congress

992
00:51:25,269 --> 00:51:27,103
from FBI director James comey,

993
00:51:27,186 --> 00:51:30,061
who wrote that agents
on an unrelated case

994
00:51:30,144 --> 00:51:32,061
had learned of the
existence of emails

995
00:51:32,144 --> 00:51:35,144
that appear to be pertinent
to the Clinton investigation.

996
00:51:35,228 --> 00:51:37,353
It's the wilderness
of mirrors now,

997
00:51:37,436 --> 00:51:39,728
in terms of investigation
upon investigation.

998
00:51:39,812 --> 00:51:42,812
We have to investigate
Hillary Clinton,

999
00:51:42,895 --> 00:51:47,353
and we have to investigate
the investigation.

1000
00:51:47,436 --> 00:51:49,895
This is out of
a Russian playbook.

1001
00:51:49,978 --> 00:51:52,395
"When nothing is real,
everything is possible,"

1002
00:51:52,478 --> 00:51:53,895
as one of Putin's critics said.

1003
00:51:53,978 --> 00:51:55,978
I don't think anybody knows
it was Russia

1004
00:51:56,061 --> 00:51:58,812
that broke into the DNC. She's
saying Russia, Russia, Russia.

1005
00:51:58,895 --> 00:52:00,561
But I don't-- Maybe it was.

1006
00:52:00,645 --> 00:52:02,603
It also could be somebody
sitting on their bed

1007
00:52:02,687 --> 00:52:05,269
that weighs 400 pounds, okay?

1008
00:52:05,353 --> 00:52:07,687
It begins to kind of

1009
00:52:07,770 --> 00:52:10,770
destroy any trust
that people have.

1010
00:52:10,853 --> 00:52:12,228
Do you make the same commitment

1011
00:52:12,311 --> 00:52:14,937
that you will absolutely accept
the result of this election?

1012
00:52:15,019 --> 00:52:16,812
I will look at it at the time.

1013
00:52:16,895 --> 00:52:20,812
And that really destroys
the credibility of democracy.

1014
00:52:20,895 --> 00:52:22,978
That's what Putin wants.

1015
00:52:27,144 --> 00:52:31,728
We look at our electronic
superimposed map of the nation

1016
00:52:31,812 --> 00:52:34,603
here out back
30 rockefeller Plaza

1017
00:52:34,687 --> 00:52:37,520
in New York,
where the sun will be rising,

1018
00:52:37,603 --> 00:52:40,770
uh, on the president-elect
Donald John trump

1019
00:52:40,853 --> 00:52:42,937
of queens, New York.

1020
00:52:53,228 --> 00:52:55,853
I felt like, you know,
my insides had fallen out.

1021
00:52:55,937 --> 00:53:00,103
It's like, I mean...
devastating.

1022
00:53:06,353 --> 00:53:10,061
For months, the newly elected
president is under fire

1023
00:53:10,144 --> 00:53:12,520
for how he's dealing
with Russia.

1024
00:53:12,603 --> 00:53:14,019
I know a lot about hacking.

1025
00:53:14,103 --> 00:53:16,061
And hacking is a very
hard thing to prove.

1026
00:53:16,144 --> 00:53:17,687
So, it could be somebody else.

1027
00:53:17,770 --> 00:53:21,269
And I also know things that
other people don't know,

1028
00:53:21,353 --> 00:53:26,395
and so, they cannot be sure
of this situation.

1029
00:53:26,478 --> 00:53:31,353
And everybody is awaiting his
first meeting ever with Vladimir Putin.

1030
00:53:31,436 --> 00:53:33,770
Which took place in
Hamburg, Germany.

1031
00:53:35,269 --> 00:53:37,019
So we all fly into Hamburg.

1032
00:53:37,103 --> 00:53:39,728
Trump meets putin, first time.

1033
00:53:39,812 --> 00:53:41,520
Has a long conversation
with him.

1034
00:53:41,603 --> 00:53:43,520
Then at the dinner that night,

1035
00:53:43,603 --> 00:53:46,353
goes off and has a separate
conversation with him

1036
00:53:46,436 --> 00:53:48,353
that no one else has witnessed.

1037
00:53:48,436 --> 00:53:52,770
President Putin and I have been
discussing various things,

1038
00:53:52,853 --> 00:53:54,395
and I think it's going
very well.

1039
00:53:54,478 --> 00:53:57,061
We've had some very,
very good talks.

1040
00:53:57,144 --> 00:53:59,395
I head back to my hotel room,

1041
00:53:59,478 --> 00:54:03,228
and as I'm checking out,
my cell phone rings.

1042
00:54:03,311 --> 00:54:04,978
It's the president.

1043
00:54:05,061 --> 00:54:09,061
"David, I just had the most
remarkable conversation

1044
00:54:09,144 --> 00:54:10,853
"with Vladimir Putin.

1045
00:54:10,937 --> 00:54:13,186
"And he tells me,

1046
00:54:13,269 --> 00:54:14,895
"that if it had been
the Russians

1047
00:54:14,978 --> 00:54:17,561
"who had meddled
in the election,

1048
00:54:17,645 --> 00:54:19,645
"we never would have seen them.

1049
00:54:19,728 --> 00:54:21,395
"And therefore,
it couldn't have been them,

1050
00:54:21,478 --> 00:54:22,853
"because they wouldn't
have been this sloppy.

1051
00:54:22,937 --> 00:54:25,978
"You write about this stuff.
You know about all of this.

1052
00:54:26,061 --> 00:54:28,061
He must be right."

1053
00:54:28,144 --> 00:54:31,395
The president was actually
looking for affirmation.

1054
00:54:31,478 --> 00:54:35,353
He was looking for
any way to deny

1055
00:54:35,436 --> 00:54:37,812
or cast doubt about
the question of whether

1056
00:54:37,895 --> 00:54:40,353
the Russians
were behind the hack.

1057
00:54:40,436 --> 00:54:42,478
And at that moment you knew

1058
00:54:42,561 --> 00:54:44,353
that the United States
government

1059
00:54:44,436 --> 00:54:46,728
was not going to organize itself

1060
00:54:46,812 --> 00:54:49,103
to push back on the Russians.

1061
00:54:55,353 --> 00:54:57,311
Let's be clear from the outset.

1062
00:54:57,395 --> 00:55:01,103
This is unlike any cyber attack
that we have seen before.

1063
00:55:01,186 --> 00:55:03,269
We want to start on this
Wednesday morning

1064
00:55:03,353 --> 00:55:04,603
with that crippling
cyber attack.

1065
00:55:04,687 --> 00:55:06,520
It's a new form of ransomware...

1066
00:55:06,603 --> 00:55:08,645
It is hitting companies
around the world

1067
00:55:08,728 --> 00:55:12,186
holding their computer systems
hostage for money.

1068
00:55:12,269 --> 00:55:16,395
In 2017, shortly after
trump came into office,

1069
00:55:16,478 --> 00:55:19,103
we saw a dramatic escalation

1070
00:55:19,186 --> 00:55:23,978
in the scale and the scope
and the nature of cyber attacks.

1071
00:55:24,061 --> 00:55:28,311
There was a massive
ransomware attack called "notpetya"

1072
00:55:28,395 --> 00:55:31,186
that started in Ukraine.

1073
00:55:34,311 --> 00:55:36,728
It was June 2017.

1074
00:55:36,812 --> 00:55:40,478
I'm deputy head of the
presidential administration.

1075
00:55:40,561 --> 00:55:44,895
Took a few days' vacation to drop
my, uh, kids to the summer camp.

1076
00:55:44,978 --> 00:55:48,061
And in the morning, I start receiving
text messages from my team.

1077
00:55:48,978 --> 00:55:51,895
"We think Ukraine
is under attack."

1078
00:55:51,978 --> 00:55:54,395
"Our infrastructure
is registering attacks.

1079
00:55:54,478 --> 00:55:57,019
The virus is destroying
computers."

1080
00:55:57,103 --> 00:55:59,019
You know, atm machines
were not working.

1081
00:55:59,103 --> 00:56:01,978
Hospitals reported
their computers being down.

1082
00:56:02,061 --> 00:56:05,353
TV station, grocery stores...

1083
00:56:05,436 --> 00:56:09,144
It was devastating.
It was spreading like fire.

1084
00:56:10,561 --> 00:56:13,770
Ukraine is Vladimir putin's
petri dish.

1085
00:56:13,853 --> 00:56:18,353
It's where he experiments
on every single technique

1086
00:56:18,436 --> 00:56:22,395
that he ultimately ended up
using in the United States.

1087
00:56:22,478 --> 00:56:25,395
Breaking into emails,
and making them public.

1088
00:56:25,478 --> 00:56:29,228
Sowing chaos
with disinformation.

1089
00:56:29,311 --> 00:56:32,687
Russia was constantly testing
different strategies,

1090
00:56:32,770 --> 00:56:35,186
and different approaches,
in Ukraine.

1091
00:56:35,269 --> 00:56:37,353
attacks on the electrical grid,

1092
00:56:37,436 --> 00:56:40,061
2015, 2016.

1093
00:56:40,144 --> 00:56:43,186
Attack on the transportation
infrastructure.

1094
00:56:43,269 --> 00:56:47,395
Odessa airport,
Ukrainian subway in Kiev.

1095
00:56:47,478 --> 00:56:50,353
You don't see the regular war.

1096
00:56:50,436 --> 00:56:54,311
But war is taking place,
and it's devastating.

1097
00:56:55,311 --> 00:56:57,228
With its notpetya attack,

1098
00:56:57,311 --> 00:56:59,228
what the Russians
didn't count on

1099
00:56:59,311 --> 00:57:02,228
is that the spreading
algorithms that they put in

1100
00:57:02,311 --> 00:57:03,853
were so aggressive that

1101
00:57:03,937 --> 00:57:06,395
it wouldn't just contain itself
to the network of one company.

1102
00:57:06,478 --> 00:57:09,228
any firms with any
links to Ukraine

1103
00:57:09,311 --> 00:57:12,645
are being contaminated
by this contagious virus.

1104
00:57:12,728 --> 00:57:16,395
It would quickly jump out,
and compromise contractors,

1105
00:57:16,478 --> 00:57:18,395
other networks that you
may be connected with.

1106
00:57:18,478 --> 00:57:21,061
It escapes the box, and it
begins to hit the corporations

1107
00:57:21,144 --> 00:57:22,603
and companies
all around the world.

1108
00:57:22,687 --> 00:57:24,978
Maersk shipping was one.

1109
00:57:25,061 --> 00:57:26,853
Fedex was another.

1110
00:57:26,937 --> 00:57:29,436
They lost hundreds of millions
of dollars of business

1111
00:57:29,520 --> 00:57:32,186
just from the loss
of business operations

1112
00:57:32,269 --> 00:57:34,311
and the money they had
to pay to remediate

1113
00:57:34,395 --> 00:57:36,687
the damage to their systems.

1114
00:57:37,687 --> 00:57:39,978
There was one other aspect

1115
00:57:40,061 --> 00:57:42,186
to the notpetya attacks

1116
00:57:42,269 --> 00:57:46,144
that made this story
really complicated.

1117
00:57:46,228 --> 00:57:49,561
It turned out that
a component of the attacks

1118
00:57:49,645 --> 00:57:53,061
had relied on code
that had been stolen

1119
00:57:53,144 --> 00:57:56,311
from inside the NSA.

1120
00:57:57,228 --> 00:57:59,144
In the summer of 2016,

1121
00:57:59,228 --> 00:58:02,812
a group that called itself
theshadowbrokers

1122
00:58:02,895 --> 00:58:07,228
began posting thousands
of lines of this code

1123
00:58:07,311 --> 00:58:09,770
to make it clear to the NSA

1124
00:58:09,853 --> 00:58:12,353
that they had the crown jewels.

1125
00:58:13,561 --> 00:58:16,269
Before long, the North Koreans

1126
00:58:16,353 --> 00:58:18,645
used parts of the
shadowbrokers code

1127
00:58:18,728 --> 00:58:22,687
when they attacked with
a weapon called wannacry.

1128
00:58:22,770 --> 00:58:25,687
This specific worm that was
leaked from the NSA's toolkit

1129
00:58:25,770 --> 00:58:27,103
targeted Microsoft windows.

1130
00:58:27,186 --> 00:58:29,144
Windows-based computers
in the US

1131
00:58:29,228 --> 00:58:32,353
and across the globe
could be at risk.

1132
00:58:35,645 --> 00:58:38,395
I will always remember
on that morning,

1133
00:58:38,478 --> 00:58:41,728
sitting in the meeting of
Microsoft's senior leadership team.

1134
00:58:41,812 --> 00:58:44,353
And all of a sudden,
people are seeing emails

1135
00:58:44,436 --> 00:58:45,978
pop up on their screen.

1136
00:58:46,061 --> 00:58:49,353
Reports from one customer
after another. "What's going on?"

1137
00:58:49,436 --> 00:58:53,269
We're getting details of this massive
international cyber attack today.

1138
00:58:53,353 --> 00:58:56,812
Hackers demanding money
have paralyzed computers

1139
00:58:56,895 --> 00:58:59,853
In at least 99 countries.

1140
00:58:59,937 --> 00:59:01,937
You could almost see this worm

1141
00:59:02,019 --> 00:59:03,978
moving with the time zones

1142
00:59:04,061 --> 00:59:08,228
across the Atlantic ocean
from Europe to North America.

1143
00:59:11,019 --> 00:59:14,311
It was as if we had lost
the blueprints

1144
00:59:14,395 --> 00:59:16,353
for an American missile.

1145
00:59:16,436 --> 00:59:20,228
The North Koreans
and the Russians had grabbed it,

1146
00:59:20,311 --> 00:59:22,728
improved upon it,
designed a prototype,

1147
00:59:22,812 --> 00:59:27,478
and shot it back at
American allies and friends.

1148
00:59:27,561 --> 00:59:31,728
It attacked 155 countries
in one day.

1149
00:59:31,812 --> 00:59:34,103
In the history of humanity,

1150
00:59:34,186 --> 00:59:37,978
no weapon has ever been fired
by a single country

1151
00:59:38,061 --> 00:59:41,978
in a way that hit so many
other nations simultaneously.

1152
00:59:44,561 --> 00:59:47,186
The volume of attacks
is escalating.

1153
00:59:47,269 --> 00:59:50,561
The sophistication
of attacks is escalating.

1154
00:59:50,645 --> 00:59:53,853
And the debate about
how to go deal with it

1155
00:59:53,937 --> 00:59:57,019
is only getting
more and more confusing.

1156
01:00:06,478 --> 01:00:09,436
It was my first day
as council president.

1157
01:00:09,520 --> 01:00:11,478
It was about 12 o'clock
in the morning.

1158
01:00:11,561 --> 01:00:14,520
I'm on my work phone
and I try to get into my email,

1159
01:00:14,603 --> 01:00:16,186
and it doesn't work.

1160
01:00:16,269 --> 01:00:18,937
And then I get onto my
Surface Pro, and it doesn't work.

1161
01:00:19,019 --> 01:00:21,520
And so I start to call some
other folks that I knew would be up

1162
01:00:21,603 --> 01:00:23,687
and I was told that
we had been hacked.

1163
01:00:24,978 --> 01:00:27,603
We had been hit by
a ransomware attack.

1164
01:00:27,687 --> 01:00:29,144
We were advised by--

1165
01:00:29,228 --> 01:00:31,687
uh, the administration but also
from the federal government--

1166
01:00:31,770 --> 01:00:34,144
that we should not
pay that ransom.

1167
01:00:34,228 --> 01:00:37,770
We couldn't communicate with the people
that we normally communicate with.

1168
01:00:37,853 --> 01:00:40,228
People couldn't come in
and fill out for their permits.

1169
01:00:40,311 --> 01:00:41,937
Real estate deals
could not be done.

1170
01:00:42,019 --> 01:00:43,144
Bills could not be paid.

1171
01:00:43,228 --> 01:00:44,478
Parking tickets could
not be paid.

1172
01:00:44,561 --> 01:00:45,978
Fines could not be paid.

1173
01:00:46,061 --> 01:00:48,978
We're talking about lots
and lots of business in the city

1174
01:00:49,061 --> 01:00:50,395
that could not be done

1175
01:00:50,478 --> 01:00:52,478
because the systems
were crippled

1176
01:00:52,561 --> 01:00:54,561
and pushed down to a halt.

1177
01:00:54,645 --> 01:00:59,061
I lost, you know,
literally 12 years of files.

1178
01:00:59,144 --> 01:01:01,812
What was the cost to Baltimore,
ultimately?

1179
01:01:01,895 --> 01:01:04,019
Yeah, it was upwards
of $15 million,

1180
01:01:04,103 --> 01:01:08,436
is what we had to, to pay out and
to rebuild, and build better systems.

1181
01:01:08,520 --> 01:01:11,478
And the original ransom
was far less than that.

1182
01:01:11,561 --> 01:01:12,978
Far less than that,
but, you know,

1183
01:01:13,061 --> 01:01:16,144
the mayor made a decision
based on the advice of,

1184
01:01:16,228 --> 01:01:19,561
uh, public safety experts
to not pay it.

1185
01:01:22,561 --> 01:01:26,853
Cites across america
have been paralyzed.

1186
01:01:26,937 --> 01:01:29,853
And some of them, including
one small town in Florida,

1187
01:01:29,937 --> 01:01:32,103
decided it was cheaper
to pay the ransom

1188
01:01:32,186 --> 01:01:34,770
than to try to go rebuild
the databases.

1189
01:01:36,937 --> 01:01:38,687
Cities and governments
around the country,

1190
01:01:38,770 --> 01:01:41,436
businesses around the country,
non-profits around the country,

1191
01:01:41,520 --> 01:01:43,186
school systems
around the country,

1192
01:01:43,269 --> 01:01:46,186
have to understand that this
is the world that we live in now.

1193
01:01:46,269 --> 01:01:48,478
Right? This is the new normal.

1194
01:01:58,436 --> 01:02:01,937
Secretary Nielsen,
looking ahead to 2018,

1195
01:02:02,019 --> 01:02:06,103
what is DHS's current estimation

1196
01:02:06,186 --> 01:02:08,436
of the threat to our elections,

1197
01:02:08,520 --> 01:02:12,228
from Russia, or any other
hostile actor?

1198
01:02:12,311 --> 01:02:13,978
We think the threat
remains high.

1199
01:02:14,061 --> 01:02:15,478
Uh, we think vigilance
is important,

1200
01:02:15,561 --> 01:02:18,186
and we think there's a lot
that we all need to do,

1201
01:02:18,269 --> 01:02:19,770
uh, at all levels of government,

1202
01:02:19,853 --> 01:02:22,311
uh, before we have
the midterm elections.

1203
01:02:25,395 --> 01:02:27,269
When it comes to elections,

1204
01:02:27,353 --> 01:02:29,561
the president never,
uh, understandably,

1205
01:02:29,645 --> 01:02:32,478
never wanted the results
of the elec--

1206
01:02:32,561 --> 01:02:34,937
of the election
to be questioned.

1207
01:02:35,645 --> 01:02:37,395
It was very difficult,

1208
01:02:37,478 --> 01:02:41,353
but those who need to be
focused on the elections,

1209
01:02:41,436 --> 01:02:43,561
they know what they need to do.

1210
01:02:43,645 --> 01:02:46,353
The people who need to do
the work that needs to be done,

1211
01:02:46,436 --> 01:02:50,311
have really dug in and,
and recognized the, the threat.

1212
01:02:55,561 --> 01:02:57,687
When he was running
for president,

1213
01:02:57,770 --> 01:03:01,353
trump had not really
thought about cyber.

1214
01:03:01,436 --> 01:03:03,853
I don't think he had even
heard about stuxnet.

1215
01:03:03,937 --> 01:03:07,186
He certainly never registered
what it was all about.

1216
01:03:08,186 --> 01:03:11,311
He said to me at one point,
"Oh. The cyber.

1217
01:03:11,395 --> 01:03:13,687
The cyber is very powerful."

1218
01:03:15,937 --> 01:03:19,228
But candidate trump said he
wanted to pull American troops

1219
01:03:19,311 --> 01:03:23,228
out of the middle east, out
of South Korea, out of Japan.

1220
01:03:23,311 --> 01:03:26,770
So he saw cyber as
this magic bullet.

1221
01:03:26,853 --> 01:03:30,853
Today I'm convening this meeting
to follow through

1222
01:03:30,937 --> 01:03:35,478
on my promise to secure
crucial infrastructure.

1223
01:03:35,561 --> 01:03:38,353
And the networks that
we've been talking so much about

1224
01:03:38,436 --> 01:03:41,645
over the last period of time
of the federal government

1225
01:03:41,728 --> 01:03:44,895
against cyber threats.

1226
01:03:51,895 --> 01:03:54,603
By the time trump
became president,

1227
01:03:54,687 --> 01:03:59,520
the United States had built up this
massive, offensive cyber program.

1228
01:04:03,353 --> 01:04:05,812
It had gone after
North Korea's missiles.

1229
01:04:05,895 --> 01:04:07,812
North Korea has once again
attempted to launch

1230
01:04:07,895 --> 01:04:09,395
a ballistic missile, and failed.

1231
01:04:09,478 --> 01:04:12,103
They Mark the second
and third launch failures.

1232
01:04:12,186 --> 01:04:14,561
Another failure.

1233
01:04:14,645 --> 01:04:18,853
Using code to send those
missiles spinning into the sea.

1234
01:04:22,770 --> 01:04:27,061
It had gone after the Isis
recruitment system.

1235
01:04:27,144 --> 01:04:30,687
It was called
"operation glowing symphony."

1236
01:04:30,770 --> 01:04:34,603
And the idea basically
was to knock Isis offline.

1237
01:04:37,061 --> 01:04:40,645
But one of the key lessons
of the Obama administration

1238
01:04:40,728 --> 01:04:44,687
was that despite developing
all these new capabilities,

1239
01:04:44,770 --> 01:04:49,228
it took far too long to get
cyber operations approved.

1240
01:04:50,853 --> 01:04:53,311
During the time I was in
the department of defense,

1241
01:04:53,395 --> 01:04:55,353
not even the
secretary of defense

1242
01:04:55,436 --> 01:04:57,228
could approve an offensive
cyber operation.

1243
01:04:57,311 --> 01:04:59,061
That was only the president of
the United States.

1244
01:04:59,144 --> 01:05:01,687
President Trump has taken
a very different approach,

1245
01:05:01,770 --> 01:05:05,061
where he's delegated
the approval authority

1246
01:05:05,144 --> 01:05:07,186
to a lot of offensive
cyber operations,

1247
01:05:07,269 --> 01:05:08,937
not only to
the secretary of defense,

1248
01:05:09,019 --> 01:05:11,937
but to the commander
of cyber command.

1249
01:05:12,019 --> 01:05:14,311
What do you think our
adversaries think right now?

1250
01:05:14,395 --> 01:05:17,812
If you do a cyber attack on
America, what's gonna happen to 'em?

1251
01:05:17,895 --> 01:05:20,812
So, basically, uh,
I would say right now, um,

1252
01:05:20,895 --> 01:05:23,311
they do not, um, think that
much will happen to them.

1253
01:05:23,395 --> 01:05:26,144
-They don't fear us.
-They don't fear us.

1254
01:05:27,978 --> 01:05:30,770
Once general nakasone
took over at the NSA

1255
01:05:30,853 --> 01:05:32,061
and cyber command,

1256
01:05:32,144 --> 01:05:34,103
he put together
within the organization

1257
01:05:34,186 --> 01:05:36,228
something called the
Russia small group,

1258
01:05:36,311 --> 01:05:41,395
who were determined to take an
aggressive stance against the Russians.

1259
01:05:43,353 --> 01:05:46,978
For several years,
the United States had warned

1260
01:05:47,061 --> 01:05:51,061
that Russian hackers were
inside the US electric grid.

1261
01:05:51,812 --> 01:05:53,436
In 2018,

1262
01:05:53,520 --> 01:05:56,603
the NSA took American-made code

1263
01:05:56,687 --> 01:06:01,103
and put it inside the Russian
electric grid.

1264
01:06:01,186 --> 01:06:03,228
And they designed some of it

1265
01:06:03,311 --> 01:06:06,061
in a way to make sure
the Russians saw them.

1266
01:06:07,019 --> 01:06:08,770
It was supposed to say,

1267
01:06:08,853 --> 01:06:11,103
"we're not gonna do this
in a covert way.

1268
01:06:11,186 --> 01:06:13,269
"We're gonna make you understand

1269
01:06:13,353 --> 01:06:14,687
what the price will be."

1270
01:06:18,937 --> 01:06:21,186
There were also
a series of messages

1271
01:06:21,269 --> 01:06:23,645
sent to Russian
influence operatives

1272
01:06:23,728 --> 01:06:25,812
that said, "we know who you are.

1273
01:06:25,895 --> 01:06:28,478
"If you continue to conduct
cyber attacks,

1274
01:06:28,561 --> 01:06:32,228
"and if you try to target
the election in 2018,

1275
01:06:32,311 --> 01:06:33,728
there will be repercussions."

1276
01:06:33,812 --> 01:06:35,978
There were very targeted
cyber operations

1277
01:06:36,061 --> 01:06:37,895
to make it clear that
we knew who was doing what,

1278
01:06:37,978 --> 01:06:41,269
and we were gonna degrade
their capability to succeed.

1279
01:06:44,478 --> 01:06:47,687
In 2018, in the lead-up
to election day,

1280
01:06:47,770 --> 01:06:52,186
cyber command takes down the
Russian Internet research agency.

1281
01:06:52,269 --> 01:06:55,770
They got in there, and really
took apart their home network.

1282
01:06:55,853 --> 01:06:57,144
Really disabled it,

1283
01:06:57,228 --> 01:06:58,937
so that they wouldn't be able

1284
01:06:59,019 --> 01:07:01,061
to conduct their
social media campaign.

1285
01:07:03,603 --> 01:07:06,436
This was a very
forward-leaning operation.

1286
01:07:06,520 --> 01:07:09,269
It looked to be
pretty successful.

1287
01:07:09,353 --> 01:07:12,978
Russian actors were somewhat
quiet during that period.

1288
01:07:14,186 --> 01:07:15,895
The question is,
how long will that last?

1289
01:07:15,978 --> 01:07:20,269
Can we defend forward against
every, you know, potential actor?

1290
01:07:24,019 --> 01:07:25,520
Good morning,
Sandra and ed.

1291
01:07:25,603 --> 01:07:27,853
And now it is up to
the Iowa voters.

1292
01:07:27,937 --> 01:07:30,895
Iowans in more than
1,600 precincts are gathering

1293
01:07:30,978 --> 01:07:34,561
to back the person they want to win
the Democratic presidential nomination.

1294
01:07:34,645 --> 01:07:36,311
My purpose here is very simple.

1295
01:07:36,395 --> 01:07:38,687
It's to come before you
one more time

1296
01:07:38,770 --> 01:07:41,520
and ask you to caucus for me.

1297
01:07:41,603 --> 01:07:44,228
we are still awaiting
the first official results

1298
01:07:44,311 --> 01:07:45,561
given to US by the party.

1299
01:07:45,645 --> 01:07:48,311
Obviously, things are going
a bit slow for them.

1300
01:07:48,395 --> 01:07:51,937
Sixteen hours since
the Iowa caucuses began.

1301
01:07:52,019 --> 01:07:53,728
We're still waiting for
the results.

1302
01:07:53,812 --> 01:07:57,061
The app didn't work.
No one knew if it would.

1303
01:07:57,144 --> 01:07:59,478
This is, so far, not so good.

1304
01:08:01,937 --> 01:08:03,728
Iowa was exactly my worst fear.

1305
01:08:03,812 --> 01:08:08,353
The biggest concern was that voters
would not be able to trust the system.

1306
01:08:08,436 --> 01:08:10,061
What about the confidence
in the vote?

1307
01:08:10,144 --> 01:08:11,895
Especially with,
against the backdrop

1308
01:08:11,978 --> 01:08:13,687
of the Russian
interference in 2016.

1309
01:08:13,770 --> 01:08:17,144
What Iowa is demonstrating to
adversaries of the United States is

1310
01:08:17,228 --> 01:08:19,269
all they have to do
is create that appearance.

1311
01:08:19,353 --> 01:08:22,103
And they probably don't even have
to create their own disinformation.

1312
01:08:22,186 --> 01:08:23,937
American partisans
will do it for them.

1313
01:08:24,019 --> 01:08:25,895
The president�s son
was saying it�s rigged.

1314
01:08:25,978 --> 01:08:27,228
The president's
campaign manager.

1315
01:08:27,311 --> 01:08:28,603
The Biden campaign
is out there

1316
01:08:28,687 --> 01:08:30,436
openly saying they don't trust

1317
01:08:30,520 --> 01:08:31,770
what the results will be.

1318
01:08:31,853 --> 01:08:35,061
They've created what's called
a perception hack.

1319
01:08:35,144 --> 01:08:38,061
Our mind immediately
goes to the question,

1320
01:08:38,144 --> 01:08:40,478
"Are the Russians
messing with our election?"

1321
01:08:40,561 --> 01:08:42,853
It doesn't matter whether
they are or they aren't.

1322
01:08:42,937 --> 01:08:45,937
This is one of the confusing
aspects of election security.

1323
01:08:46,019 --> 01:08:48,937
It's not just about
trying to hack into computers.

1324
01:08:49,019 --> 01:08:51,395
There's another aspect
of election interference

1325
01:08:51,478 --> 01:08:53,311
that's about trying to
hack into your brain.

1326
01:08:53,395 --> 01:08:55,561
They're ultimately trying
to get the American people

1327
01:08:55,645 --> 01:08:58,269
to lose confidence
in the system.

1328
01:08:58,353 --> 01:09:00,228
That the system
is beyond repair.

1329
01:09:00,311 --> 01:09:03,478
That the system is broken,
and their vote doesn't matter.

1330
01:09:03,561 --> 01:09:06,978
US officials have now told, uh,
Senator Bernie Sanders that Russia

1331
01:09:07,061 --> 01:09:10,770
is trying to help his
presidential campaign.

1332
01:09:10,853 --> 01:09:12,061
How do you think
it came out now,

1333
01:09:12,144 --> 01:09:13,478
if you had the briefing
a month ago?

1334
01:09:13,561 --> 01:09:15,978
Well, I'll let you guess
about one day before the, uh,

1335
01:09:16,061 --> 01:09:18,311
Nevada caucus. Why do you think
it came out?

1336
01:09:18,395 --> 01:09:21,144
'Cause the "Washington Post"?
Good friends.

1337
01:09:21,228 --> 01:09:23,853
Joe, what do you say
to the Russians?

1338
01:09:24,395 --> 01:09:25,978
I'm comin'.

1339
01:09:26,061 --> 01:09:27,311
They're continuing to meddle.

1340
01:09:27,395 --> 01:09:29,978
They're involved in this race,
and in my primary.

1341
01:09:30,061 --> 01:09:32,561
They're involved
going after me on Facebook.

1342
01:09:32,645 --> 01:09:34,269
They've already been taken down.

1343
01:09:34,353 --> 01:09:36,311
Because Putin knows me
and I know him,

1344
01:09:36,395 --> 01:09:38,228
and he doesn't want me
to be president.

1345
01:09:38,311 --> 01:09:41,895
The Russians want everyone in
this country to mistrust everything.

1346
01:09:41,978 --> 01:09:43,436
Whether or not
the Russians are involved,

1347
01:09:43,520 --> 01:09:45,186
these next few months
are gonna be tense.

1348
01:09:47,895 --> 01:09:49,395
We do have breaking news.

1349
01:09:49,478 --> 01:09:52,728
The coronavirus outbreak
is now a global pandemic.

1350
01:09:52,812 --> 01:09:54,478
No country is untouched.

1351
01:09:54,561 --> 01:09:57,645
No part of our everyday lives
is untouched.

1352
01:09:57,728 --> 01:09:59,770
We will see more cases,

1353
01:09:59,853 --> 01:10:01,770
and things will get worse.

1354
01:10:03,645 --> 01:10:05,353
The coronavirus

1355
01:10:05,436 --> 01:10:09,520
has reordered the competition
for world power.

1356
01:10:09,603 --> 01:10:11,520
And so, it's not surprising

1357
01:10:11,603 --> 01:10:13,978
that it's reordered
cyber power, as well.

1358
01:10:14,061 --> 01:10:16,395
Bad information is now
spreading online

1359
01:10:16,478 --> 01:10:18,853
faster than
the coronavirus itself.

1360
01:10:18,937 --> 01:10:20,853
Cyber experts and
public health officials

1361
01:10:20,937 --> 01:10:24,103
warm this so-called
info-demic is dangerous,

1362
01:10:24,186 --> 01:10:26,103
and needs to be contained.

1363
01:10:27,853 --> 01:10:30,311
In the midst of covid-19,

1364
01:10:30,395 --> 01:10:33,561
disinformation gets
super caffeinated.

1365
01:10:33,645 --> 01:10:35,186
And we see it play out

1366
01:10:35,269 --> 01:10:38,353
in Russia's favorite
petri dish once again,

1367
01:10:38,436 --> 01:10:40,478
In Ukraine.

1368
01:10:48,311 --> 01:10:51,061
As the coronavirus began
spreading across the world,

1369
01:10:51,144 --> 01:10:53,728
Ukraine quickly moved
to start bringing

1370
01:10:53,812 --> 01:10:56,353
some of its citizens back
from Wuhan,

1371
01:10:56,436 --> 01:10:59,895
to serve out 14 days
of self-isolation

1372
01:10:59,978 --> 01:11:03,353
in this tiny little town
in central Ukraine.

1373
01:11:03,436 --> 01:11:06,645
These people were not
infected with the virus.

1374
01:11:06,728 --> 01:11:11,436
But people on social media
began spreading this misinformation

1375
01:11:11,520 --> 01:11:15,561
that these Ukrainians that are
coming home from Wuhan are infected.

1376
01:11:16,895 --> 01:11:19,687
People started using viber,

1377
01:11:19,770 --> 01:11:23,645
and Instagram and Facebook
to warn each other.

1378
01:11:23,728 --> 01:11:26,812
Some of the messages
went even further in saying

1379
01:11:26,895 --> 01:11:29,520
we need to go out
into the streets and protest.

1380
01:11:29,603 --> 01:11:33,019
We need to turn these buses of
people around to protect our children.

1381
01:11:33,103 --> 01:11:36,937
Or else we're going to wake up in
the morning, and we'll all be dead.

1382
01:11:37,019 --> 01:11:40,603
-This disinformation
actually fueled

1383
01:11:40,687 --> 01:11:43,103
a real-life protest
in the streets.

1384
01:11:53,478 --> 01:11:55,311
Police came out in response.

1385
01:11:55,395 --> 01:11:57,061
Clashes ensued.

1386
01:12:00,228 --> 01:12:03,311
When something like this
happens, in Ukraine especially,

1387
01:12:03,395 --> 01:12:07,478
the entity that is always
pointed at first is Russia.

1388
01:12:07,561 --> 01:12:12,061
There are signs that Russia
could be involved.

1389
01:12:12,144 --> 01:12:14,478
But there are real people
in these groups.

1390
01:12:14,561 --> 01:12:16,186
Real people who I interviewed,

1391
01:12:16,269 --> 01:12:19,311
who said, "I also shared
messages in this group

1392
01:12:19,395 --> 01:12:20,645
"to go out and protest,

1393
01:12:20,728 --> 01:12:22,478
to protect myself,
to protect my family."

1394
01:12:22,561 --> 01:12:25,061
And it just spiraled out of
control very, very, very quickly.

1395
01:12:25,144 --> 01:12:26,186
Within hours.

1396
01:12:28,395 --> 01:12:31,311
There's a lesson in
what happened in Ukraine.

1397
01:12:31,395 --> 01:12:34,853
The Russians are already
changing the playbook.

1398
01:12:34,937 --> 01:12:36,561
They're targeting people

1399
01:12:36,645 --> 01:12:39,395
who might be susceptible
to the message,

1400
01:12:39,478 --> 01:12:41,228
the conspiracy.

1401
01:12:41,311 --> 01:12:43,269
And repeat it themselves.

1402
01:12:44,269 --> 01:12:46,311
And it's not just the Russians.

1403
01:12:46,395 --> 01:12:49,436
The pandemic now becoming
even more than a public health crisis.

1404
01:12:49,520 --> 01:12:51,812
It is turning into a major
diplomatic clash

1405
01:12:51,895 --> 01:12:55,395
as the blame game unfolds
on the origins of the virus.

1406
01:12:55,478 --> 01:12:57,853
I would like to begin

1407
01:12:57,937 --> 01:12:59,853
by announcing some
important developments

1408
01:12:59,937 --> 01:13:03,144
in our war against
the Chinese virus.

1409
01:13:09,728 --> 01:13:11,937
The Chinese in 2020

1410
01:13:12,019 --> 01:13:14,395
have used disinformation
brilliantly

1411
01:13:14,478 --> 01:13:18,895
as people have been
casting blame for COVID-19.

1412
01:13:18,978 --> 01:13:20,728
There was a story spread

1413
01:13:20,812 --> 01:13:24,103
that the virus didn't begin
in a wet market in Wuhan.

1414
01:13:24,186 --> 01:13:29,728
But instead that it began with
a US army exercise in China.

1415
01:13:29,812 --> 01:13:33,144
There's absolutely
no evidence for this at all.

1416
01:13:33,228 --> 01:13:35,019
But the Chinese saw

1417
01:13:35,103 --> 01:13:39,311
how well the Russians were
able to plant this information,

1418
01:13:39,395 --> 01:13:42,186
And watch it take off naturally

1419
01:13:42,269 --> 01:13:45,937
among conspiracy theorists
and others.

1420
01:13:52,144 --> 01:13:54,770
I think we�ve been
highly distracted as a country

1421
01:13:54,853 --> 01:13:58,061
by focusing just on Russia
since 2016.

1422
01:13:58,144 --> 01:14:01,353
When the real long-term
strategic challenge for us

1423
01:14:01,436 --> 01:14:03,561
is going to be China globally.

1424
01:14:03,645 --> 01:14:06,478
Russian foreign policy
is to take others down,

1425
01:14:06,561 --> 01:14:09,019
and cause disruption
in the system.

1426
01:14:09,853 --> 01:14:11,436
China has very
different priorities.

1427
01:14:11,520 --> 01:14:13,812
They're trying to work within the
system and take over the system,

1428
01:14:13,895 --> 01:14:16,478
so they're not interested
in chaos. It's all about theft.

1429
01:14:16,561 --> 01:14:18,812
And primarily theft of
intellectual property

1430
01:14:18,895 --> 01:14:21,520
that can be used to further
build up the Chinese economy.

1431
01:14:25,144 --> 01:14:27,603
There was one time we were
brought into a company

1432
01:14:27,687 --> 01:14:30,353
that was in the satellite
communications business.

1433
01:14:31,269 --> 01:14:32,603
They had discovered a hack,

1434
01:14:32,687 --> 01:14:34,645
and, uh, they asked us
to analyze it,

1435
01:14:34,728 --> 01:14:37,311
and ultimately help
protect them.

1436
01:14:38,019 --> 01:14:40,228
We saw that the email address

1437
01:14:40,311 --> 01:14:42,978
that was being used to register
a bunch of this infrastructure

1438
01:14:43,061 --> 01:14:45,144
was being reused continuously.

1439
01:14:45,228 --> 01:14:47,687
It was a gmail address.

1440
01:14:47,770 --> 01:14:49,978
And we tracked it to
an individual in China.

1441
01:14:50,061 --> 01:14:52,311
They had a social persona,

1442
01:14:52,395 --> 01:14:54,144
and had a Picasa album,

1443
01:14:54,228 --> 01:14:58,144
which at the time was a photo
album that was owned by Google.

1444
01:14:58,228 --> 01:15:01,144
It was open, and he had a
bunch of pictures of his girlfriend,

1445
01:15:01,228 --> 01:15:03,687
and his family, and himself.

1446
01:15:10,520 --> 01:15:13,061
And he had pictures
of his dorm room.

1447
01:15:16,061 --> 01:15:19,353
And in the corner
of the dorm room we saw a hat.

1448
01:15:22,478 --> 01:15:24,228
We started doing
imagery analysis,

1449
01:15:24,311 --> 01:15:27,269
and we noticed that
the hat was pla officer's hat.

1450
01:15:28,770 --> 01:15:30,561
We thought,
"this might be interesting."

1451
01:15:30,645 --> 01:15:32,728
We might have someone
from the Chinese military

1452
01:15:32,812 --> 01:15:35,645
on our hands here that may
be responsible for these attacks.

1453
01:15:38,812 --> 01:15:41,269
We found other pictures
that he had posted online

1454
01:15:41,353 --> 01:15:43,853
that were labeled "office."

1455
01:15:43,937 --> 01:15:47,478
There was a picture of this
big white building behind him

1456
01:15:47,561 --> 01:15:50,520
that had huge antennae dishes,

1457
01:15:50,603 --> 01:15:52,561
had reflective coating
on the windows,

1458
01:15:52,645 --> 01:15:55,103
that would prevent
signal interception.

1459
01:15:55,186 --> 01:15:57,645
We started doing satellite
imagery analysis

1460
01:15:57,728 --> 01:15:59,520
to try to locate this building.

1461
01:15:59,603 --> 01:16:02,103
We tracked it down to Shanghai.

1462
01:16:02,186 --> 01:16:03,853
To a particular area
of Shanghai.

1463
01:16:03,937 --> 01:16:06,269
We started looking at the
imagery. We said, "wait a second.

1464
01:16:06,353 --> 01:16:09,186
There's military guard gates
all over this building."

1465
01:16:09,269 --> 01:16:11,436
We got the address
of that building,

1466
01:16:11,520 --> 01:16:16,061
and we started looking into
Chinese government materials.

1467
01:16:16,144 --> 01:16:18,603
And sure enough, we discovered
there was the headquarters

1468
01:16:18,687 --> 01:16:21,061
of the 12th bureau
of the third department

1469
01:16:21,144 --> 01:16:24,103
of the general staff
of the people's liberation army,

1470
01:16:24,186 --> 01:16:26,144
giving US pretty
high-level confidence

1471
01:16:26,228 --> 01:16:29,311
that this hack had come from
the Chinese military.

1472
01:16:33,853 --> 01:16:36,436
This is actually
part of a plan.

1473
01:16:37,478 --> 01:16:40,395
They lay it out in their,
their five-year plans

1474
01:16:40,478 --> 01:16:42,561
for the technology
they want to acquire.

1475
01:16:42,645 --> 01:16:45,603
If they can generate it
indigenously, great.

1476
01:16:45,687 --> 01:16:46,895
If they can't,

1477
01:16:46,978 --> 01:16:49,687
because they want to
get it fast, they'll steal it.

1478
01:16:52,478 --> 01:16:54,853
China alone is
responsible for hacks

1479
01:16:54,937 --> 01:16:58,603
to almost 700 public
and private targets in the US

1480
01:16:58,687 --> 01:17:00,395
in the last five years.

1481
01:17:01,687 --> 01:17:03,228
One of the reasons why

1482
01:17:03,311 --> 01:17:04,770
China's most sophisticated
airplane

1483
01:17:04,853 --> 01:17:07,436
looks like the f-35
joint strike fighter

1484
01:17:07,520 --> 01:17:09,770
is because they stole
some of the technology

1485
01:17:09,853 --> 01:17:11,520
from the F-35
Joint Strike Fighter.

1486
01:17:11,603 --> 01:17:14,228
When you look at pictures of it,
you go, "Man, that looks familiar."

1487
01:17:15,603 --> 01:17:17,103
And that's just
the tip of the iceberg,

1488
01:17:17,186 --> 01:17:18,645
from the Chinese side.

1489
01:17:18,728 --> 01:17:21,186
Google says it and at least
20 other companies

1490
01:17:21,269 --> 01:17:24,395
were victims of a targeted
cyber attack originating in China.

1491
01:17:24,478 --> 01:17:28,353
A very sophisticated cyber attack
on the health insurer Anthem.

1492
01:17:28,436 --> 01:17:31,436
This intrusion is once again
the work of state-sponsored

1493
01:17:31,520 --> 01:17:34,228
espionage groups based in China.

1494
01:17:35,311 --> 01:17:36,937
And then the Chinese escalated.

1495
01:17:37,019 --> 01:17:41,311
They spent a year inside the
office of personnel management,

1496
01:17:41,395 --> 01:17:44,478
the most boring
bureaucracy in America.

1497
01:17:44,561 --> 01:17:47,019
they stole 22 million files

1498
01:17:47,103 --> 01:17:50,978
of highly classified
security clearance applications.

1499
01:17:51,061 --> 01:17:52,853
That is an intelligence
nightmare.

1500
01:17:52,937 --> 01:17:56,478
The Chinese now have all
sorts of detailed information

1501
01:17:56,561 --> 01:17:58,311
about your family members,

1502
01:17:58,395 --> 01:18:00,019
foreign friends
that you may have,

1503
01:18:00,103 --> 01:18:02,478
that could be used
to actually recruit assets

1504
01:18:02,561 --> 01:18:05,103
for the Chinese government
sometime in the future.

1505
01:18:06,728 --> 01:18:08,311
By 2020,

1506
01:18:08,395 --> 01:18:11,687
they were back at it in a
much more sophisticated way.

1507
01:18:11,770 --> 01:18:14,520
The FBI and federal
cyber security agents

1508
01:18:14,603 --> 01:18:17,853
are warning that hackers linked
to the Chinese government

1509
01:18:17,937 --> 01:18:22,770
are trying to steal research on
coronavirus vaccines and therapies.

1510
01:18:22,853 --> 01:18:26,019
The way jet fighter designs
might have been

1511
01:18:26,103 --> 01:18:27,395
a decade ago,

1512
01:18:27,478 --> 01:18:31,228
coronavirus has become
the holy grail.

1513
01:18:32,895 --> 01:18:35,269
Because the country
that wins the race

1514
01:18:35,353 --> 01:18:38,853
for the vaccine and
the treatment of covid-19

1515
01:18:38,937 --> 01:18:42,186
will become a new kind of power,

1516
01:18:42,269 --> 01:18:46,228
able to spread that vaccine
around the world.

1517
01:18:49,103 --> 01:18:51,895
Finally, and perhaps
most importantly,

1518
01:18:51,978 --> 01:18:56,311
as China has spread its economic
tentacles through the world,

1519
01:18:56,395 --> 01:18:59,019
It has recognized that
the networks

1520
01:18:59,103 --> 01:19:01,520
it is selling to everybody else

1521
01:19:01,603 --> 01:19:05,395
across fiber optic cable
and 5g networks

1522
01:19:05,478 --> 01:19:08,770
gives them an element of control

1523
01:19:08,853 --> 01:19:12,269
that a few years ago they could
scarcely have even imagined.

1524
01:19:13,478 --> 01:19:15,395
you could see a future where

1525
01:19:15,478 --> 01:19:18,103
every device that you can
imagine is on the Internet,

1526
01:19:18,186 --> 01:19:21,144
and is connected to
the 5G cellular network.

1527
01:19:21,228 --> 01:19:24,269
5G is like moving from
radio to television

1528
01:19:24,353 --> 01:19:27,103
in terms of how we use
our telecommunication system,

1529
01:19:27,186 --> 01:19:29,687
and if we're thinking about,
you know, driverless cars,

1530
01:19:29,770 --> 01:19:32,687
or our, our refrigerator that's
connected to the Internet,

1531
01:19:32,770 --> 01:19:34,228
and all of the possibilities

1532
01:19:34,311 --> 01:19:36,019
that come with a totally
interconnected world,

1533
01:19:36,103 --> 01:19:38,186
that rides on a 5G network.

1534
01:19:38,269 --> 01:19:40,269
So who controls that network

1535
01:19:40,353 --> 01:19:43,812
is extraordinarily important, and
I think what we're waking up to

1536
01:19:43,895 --> 01:19:46,269
Is we're confronting China

1537
01:19:46,353 --> 01:19:49,228
that has a national champion
in its company huawei

1538
01:19:49,311 --> 01:19:52,687
that is a long-term
security threat.

1539
01:19:52,770 --> 01:19:57,311
This company Huawei is the
largest provider of 5G equipment.

1540
01:19:57,395 --> 01:20:00,520
They're the ones building
the antennas that you need.

1541
01:20:00,603 --> 01:20:04,478
They're the ones that are building
the systems that moves the data.

1542
01:20:05,853 --> 01:20:09,228
The United States'
position on this is that

1543
01:20:09,311 --> 01:20:13,144
any information that is
able to transmit

1544
01:20:13,228 --> 01:20:15,186
across Huawei technology

1545
01:20:15,269 --> 01:20:19,770
will ultimately be accessible
by the Chinese government.

1546
01:20:19,853 --> 01:20:21,770
And what is
the Chinese government

1547
01:20:21,853 --> 01:20:24,019
going to do with
that information

1548
01:20:24,103 --> 01:20:25,978
is the ultimate question.

1549
01:20:36,478 --> 01:20:37,770
Thank you.

1550
01:20:40,228 --> 01:20:43,103
So we begin, Oklahoma. We begin.

1551
01:20:43,186 --> 01:20:45,019
Thank you, Oklahoma.

1552
01:20:45,103 --> 01:20:49,311
And thank you to
Vice President Mike Pence.

1553
01:20:49,395 --> 01:20:51,895
We begin. We begin our campaign.

1554
01:20:54,770 --> 01:20:55,895
That's nice.

1555
01:20:59,186 --> 01:21:00,728
Thank you.

1556
01:21:13,520 --> 01:21:15,812
I have spent the last year

1557
01:21:15,895 --> 01:21:19,144
gaming out the 2020 election.

1558
01:21:19,228 --> 01:21:20,770
Trying to get ahead of it.
Really trying to think through

1559
01:21:20,853 --> 01:21:22,937
what, what's next.
What's next, what's next.

1560
01:21:24,895 --> 01:21:27,186
My nightmare scenario
is ransomware.

1561
01:21:27,269 --> 01:21:31,603
That a ransomware actor would gain
access to a voter registration database,

1562
01:21:31,687 --> 01:21:35,687
lock it up, and say,
"Hey, election official.

1563
01:21:35,770 --> 01:21:37,561
"I've locked this up.

1564
01:21:37,645 --> 01:21:41,645
I'm not giving it back to you
unless you give me $3 million."

1565
01:21:43,395 --> 01:21:45,228
This is what gets me up
every morning.

1566
01:21:45,311 --> 01:21:46,603
It's the last thing
I think about at night.

1567
01:21:46,687 --> 01:21:47,853
I wake up in the middle
of the night

1568
01:21:47,937 --> 01:21:49,228
and think about it.
When I'm walking the dog.

1569
01:21:49,311 --> 01:21:51,687
Up here, oh,
it's a hellscape right now.

1570
01:21:54,978 --> 01:21:57,520
When you have a government
led by someone

1571
01:21:57,603 --> 01:22:00,603
who appears to be beholden

1572
01:22:00,687 --> 01:22:02,144
to Vladimir putin,

1573
01:22:02,228 --> 01:22:04,311
you don't have much confidence

1574
01:22:04,395 --> 01:22:07,645
that your own government
is going to protect

1575
01:22:07,728 --> 01:22:10,520
the integrity of our election.

1576
01:22:10,603 --> 01:22:13,812
I'm somebody who thinks that
putin should have paid a price.

1577
01:22:14,937 --> 01:22:16,937
I don't know if
we're gonna find out

1578
01:22:17,019 --> 01:22:18,770
exactly what the threat is

1579
01:22:18,853 --> 01:22:21,478
until, once again,
it's too late.

1580
01:22:24,311 --> 01:22:26,770
In 2020, the Russians are back,

1581
01:22:26,853 --> 01:22:29,019
but so are the Chinese.

1582
01:22:29,812 --> 01:22:31,395
And the Iranians.

1583
01:22:31,478 --> 01:22:33,728
And the North Koreans.

1584
01:22:35,269 --> 01:22:37,436
All of these countries
are just experimenting

1585
01:22:37,520 --> 01:22:40,895
with things that they learned
from watching the Russians.

1586
01:22:40,978 --> 01:22:44,645
They realize that they
can do damage to us,

1587
01:22:44,728 --> 01:22:48,395
by merely opening up
the chasms that already exist

1588
01:22:48,478 --> 01:22:50,019
in American society.

1589
01:22:58,311 --> 01:23:00,645
If it were going to be
a nation-state actor

1590
01:23:00,728 --> 01:23:03,687
who's gonna disrupt
the elections in 2020,

1591
01:23:03,770 --> 01:23:07,561
I think mostly likely
it would be the North Koreans

1592
01:23:07,645 --> 01:23:09,937
or the Iranians.

1593
01:23:10,019 --> 01:23:13,645
If we were going to look for
an Iranian attack, for example,

1594
01:23:13,728 --> 01:23:17,103
all they would have to do
is destroy one thing

1595
01:23:17,186 --> 01:23:19,269
in one state or one county,

1596
01:23:19,353 --> 01:23:22,645
in conjunction with an information
operation that would say,

1597
01:23:22,728 --> 01:23:24,978
"We are the holy warriors
of Iran,

1598
01:23:25,061 --> 01:23:27,770
and we successfully
locked up this server."

1599
01:23:27,853 --> 01:23:30,603
The press would cover it. There
would be all these questions,

1600
01:23:30,687 --> 01:23:32,520
and America would be
wrapped in knots.

1601
01:23:32,603 --> 01:23:35,186
At the same time, you know,
certain political leaders

1602
01:23:35,269 --> 01:23:36,937
might also take
advantage of that.

1603
01:23:41,853 --> 01:23:45,186
One final question. Our
intelligence agencies have said

1604
01:23:45,269 --> 01:23:47,978
that your country
is among the countries

1605
01:23:48,061 --> 01:23:50,728
that are attempting to interfere
in our election.

1606
01:23:50,812 --> 01:23:54,186
We don't interfere in the
internal affairs of another country,

1607
01:23:54,269 --> 01:23:57,144
but there is a cyber war
going on.

1608
01:23:57,228 --> 01:23:59,853
The United States started
that cyber war.

1609
01:23:59,937 --> 01:24:01,353
You remember Stuxnet.

1610
01:24:01,436 --> 01:24:05,061
Any war that
the United States starts,

1611
01:24:05,144 --> 01:24:07,561
it won't be able to finish.